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VISA AS PROPERTY, VISA AS COLLATERAL
Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown *
Abstract
Although the “tragic choice” framework has not been applied in the context
of U.S. immigration law, current immigration policy is rife with tragic
choices, defined as a commitment by policy elites to maintaining certain
illusions which shield from public view tough policy choices that offend
deeply held values. Take, for example, the issue of commodification of visas.
Policy makers remain committed to maintaining the historical illusion that
U.S. visas are open to well-deserving migrants, and are not being “sold.”
Yet U.S. immigration practice has long made concessions to
commodification at the margins. Indeed, some migrants “pay” very high
prices to obtain the right to enter the U.S. For example, certain elite visa
applicants must invest significant sums in the U.S. economy as a condition of
both obtaining and maintaining their visas. While in other countries, the
poor migrant, like the rich migrant, may pledge something of value as a
condition of receiving her visa, in the U.S., the poor migrant has no such
option. Rather, the poor migrant faces another kind of “tragic choice.” She
may pay a coyote an astronomical fee to transport her across the border
illegally, or she simply cannot come.
Why this tragic choice? A primary challenge of immigration law is that it is
notoriously difficult to screen poor visa applicants. In a quintessential
problem of informational asymmetry, the typical applicant knows much more
*
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about her likely behavior in the U.S. than the government; the government
typically has no way of evaluating the sincerity of her promise to be lawabiding. Reflecting the long-time recognition in the common law that a
contracting party is more likely to abide by her commitment if she pledges
something of value, this Article recommends that the applicant should have
to post a bond as a condition of receiving her visa. In the event that the
applicant later fails to keep her promises, including an assurance not to
overstay her visa, she would forfeit this bond.
However, there are problems with bonding regimes in the U.S. context.
Bonding regimes appear to offend deeply held public values. For example,
bonding systems may reinforce perceptions that market-based mechanisms
are being utilized to determine who receives visas, thus potentially excluding
the poor. Yet, ironically, bonding systems may actually improve the
opportunity sets of the poor. For example, a bonding system should raise the
costs of non-compliance with visas and in so doing, make it more likely that
a poor applicant will receive a visa. Thus, bonding systems may also
improve access for the poor migrant to the U.S., where she typically
significantly improves her earnings.
Herein lies the crux of the matter. The real issue is not the bonding
requirement. After all, immigration law already routinely uses market-based
mechanisms to screen rich migrants. The question becomes why poor
migrants should not have similar opportunities. The real issue is the absence
of opportunities in developing countries for poor people to access
transparent credit facilities from formal financial institutions to finance
bonds, leaving poor migrants at the mercy of black-market money lenders.
This Article seeks to make labor mobility bankable by advocating a reconceptualization of guest worker visas as a type of property, namely,
licenses for temporary admission to the U.S. If appropriately designed, these
visa-licenses could be collateral-like devices, which allow poor migrants to
access transparent law-bound credit markets.

3

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION

6

I.

IMPROVING SCREENING; BONDING AT THE
BOTTOM OF THE PYRAMID
17
A. A Disproportionate Emphasis on Due Diligence and
Assurances
17
B. A Potential Solution: the Kuwaiti Approach
20
C. Designing a Bond
22
D. The Implications of the Involvement of Financial
Intermediaries
24
E. The Relative Advantages of Bonding Arrangements 26
1. Context Sensitivity
26
2. Changing the Default Rule of Non-Enforcement 27

II.

INCENTIVITIZING FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 29
A. Interviews with Jamaican Guest Workers and
Lenders
31
B. Methodology
32
C. Summary of Focus Group Findings
33
D. How Migrants Currently Finance their Relocation
Costs
35
E. The Background Legal Context
37
F. The Four Principles Underlying the Extension of Credit
to the Poor
38
1. The Difficulties Surrounding Collateral May Lead
Banks to Forego Collateral or Enforcement of Their
Repossession Rights
39
2. Banks Structure Contacts That Enable Them to
Extract a Penalty from the Borrower, Without
Resorting to the Formal Legal System
40
3. Synergies with Relational Theories of Financing 41
G. Visas as New “New Property”
43
1. The Reich Analogy and a Visa as a Franchise or
License
43
2. A Visa’s Other Property-Like Characteristics:
Reputation
45

4

III.

INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN BENEFITS
48
A. Is This Proposal Politically Practicable?
48
1. The Key Features of Financial Intermediaries to
the Poor
49
2. Financial Intermediaries as Gate-Keepers and
Policing the Gate-Keepers
50
B. The Enforcement Question
53
1. Migration’s Network Nature and the Difficulty of
Enforcement
53
2. Financial Intermediates May Be Motivated to
Find Non-Compliant Aliens
55
3. Mitigating the Risks of Snitching
57

IV.

THE COMMODIFICATION CRITIQUE
58
A. Background: Levmore's Puzzle
58
B. Commodification Critiques
60
C. Visa-as-Collateral Differs in Critical Ways from
Traditional Market-Based Proposals
61
D. The Official Public and Academic Posture: NonCommodification
62
E. Tragic Choice Framework
64

CONCLUSION: If We are Going to Commodify, We Cannot Exclude the
Bottom of the Pyramid
65

5

Introduction
Fully three decades ago Calabresi and Bobbit famously wrote about
“tragic choices,” namely tough policy choices which offend deeply held
values, and the accompanying “subterfuges,” that is, efforts by policy elites
to shield such choices from public view. 2 Strangely, the “tragic choice”
framework has not been applied in the context of U.S. immigration law,
although current immigration policy is rife with tragic choices and
subterfuges. A case in question is the issue of commodification of visas. It is
clear that U.S. policy makers remain deeply committed to maintaining an
illusion that U.S. visas are not being “sold.” 3 For example, in the current
financial crisis, U.S. policy makers have not auctioned visas to wealthy
overseas investors who are willing to invest in depressed real-estate, a policy
suggestion that gained considerable currency as a mechanism of stemming
the sub-prime crisis. 4

2

GUIDO CALABRESI and PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978). The term
“subterfuge” is from Calabresi. GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES
AND THE LAW 88 (1985). The tragic choice framework has most famously been
applied to the issue of health care rationing. See, e.g., Leonard Fleck, Just Health
Care Rationing: A Democratic Decisionmaking Approach, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1597
(1992) For example, how do we decide which sick patients receive expensive liver
transplants? Their moral culpability in damaging their current liver, for example,
through alcoholism? Their ability to pay for the transplant? Their likelihood of longterm survival? Their historical or future contribution to society?
3
Indeed a recent article in the Economist makes precisely this point. See The
Price of Entry: A New Proposal from Gary Becker to make a market in immigration,
ECONOMIST,
June
24,
2010
available
at
THE
http://www.economist.com/node/16424085?story_id=16424085
(noting
that
Becker’s proposal to auction visas, while innovative, has almost no chance of
success, given the background hostility to such ideas). This public posture of elites
fits with a broader public suspicion of selling visas as evidenced by polling, since
visas often signify a potential route to citizenship. See generally the polling data
discussed in Shaheen Borna and James M. Stearns, The Ethics and Efficacy of
Selling National Citizenship, 37 J. OF BUS. ETHICS, 193 (May 2002).
4
The New York Times columnist, Thomas Friedman is the most notable
proponent of this policy. Friedman interviewed Indian elites, who cited the
willingness of Indian investors to invest in foreclosed U.S. properties, if immigration
benefits would attach to such investments. Thomas Friedman, The Open Door
Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009, at A31.
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Yet, U.S. immigration practice has long made concessions to
commodification. First, there are the “unofficial concessions” to
commodification at the margins.
One might call these “informal
subterfuges,” as a cottage industry has developed with labor brokers and
coyotes charging applicants high fees to gain entry to the United States. 5
Notably, these fees are pervasive, not only in the “black” and “gray” markets
(that is, markets outside of the formal economy, sometimes involving
inherently illegal activities such as undocumented border crossings). They
are also pervasive in the “white” markets (within the formal economy). For
example, elite applicants typically employ attorneys and sometimes lobbyists
who charge high fees to navigate the complexities of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA). 6 There are also the official concessions to
commodification. Indeed, the INA mandates that some migrants “pay” very
high prices to obtain the right to enter the U.S. A case in question is certain
elite visa applicants who must invest significant sums in the U.S. economy as
a condition of both obtaining and maintaining their visas. 7
While in other countries, the poor migrant, like the rich migrant, may
pledge something of value as a condition of receiving her visa, in the U.S.,
the poor migrant has no such option. 8 Rather, the poor migrant faces another
kind of “tragic choice.” She may pay a coyote an astronomical fee to
5

I learned this through an interview with the sociologist, David Spener who
has conducted ethnographic research on coyote transportation networks and the
exorbitant fees that undocumented migrants pay to coyotes and brokers.
6
See, e.g., Evan Perez and Gregory White, FBI Lets Barred Tycoon Visit
U.S., WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2009, at A1 (noting that the lobbyist and former
Presidential candidate Bob Dole successfully lobbied for a visa for a Russian
billionaire, Oleg Deripaska who had previously been barred from the U.S. due to
concerns regarding links to organized crime).
7
For example see 8 U.S.C. §1153(b)(5) (1994) (providing for visas to be
issued to immigrants who invest at least one million dollars in a start-up American
business that generates full-time jobs for ten United States citizens or lawful
residents.) For a description of how this works in practice, see The Economist Blog,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2010/06/immigration_0.
8
This is true in rich Asian countries such as Singapore and in nearly all of
the Middle Eastern states who rely heavily on migrant workers. See Dovelyn
Rannveig Agunias and Kathleen Newland, Circular Migration and Development:
Trends, Policy Routes, and Ways Forward, (Migration Pol. Inst.), April 2007,
available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MigDevPB_041807.pdf; see also
ORN BODVARRSON and HENDRIK VAN DEN BERG, TEMPORARY MIGRATION
INVOLUNTARY MIGRATION AND OTHER VARIATIONS ON THE STANDARD MODEL 26184 (2009).
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transport her across the border illegally at great risk to her personal safety, or
she simply cannot come. There is a reason for this tragic choice, namely, a
failure of U.S. policy makers to face head-on a primary challenge of
immigration law: it is notoriously difficult to screen a poor low-skilled visa
applicant who is typically not well placed to provide documentary evidence
of credible ties to her country of origin, which will lead her to return home at
the end of her visa’s tenure. Typically, the poor low-skilled applicant pledges
to be law-abiding during her tenure in the U.S., specifically promising to
avoid visa-overstay. Yet, the high rates of visa overstay among migrants
generally and among poor low-skilled temporary workers in particular, 9 is
evidence of a quintessential problem of information asymmetry. 10 That is,
the typical applicant knows much more about whether she will return to her
home country than the U.S. government; the government typically has no
way of evaluating the sincerity of her commitments. To overcome this

9

Nearly half of the undocumented population of twelve million overstayed
their visas. See Ted Robbins, Nearly Half of Illegal Immigrants Overstay Visa, on
All
Things
Considered
(July
14,
2006)
available
at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5485917. Moreover, the U.S.
is unable to trace most persons who overstay their visas. See also James C.
McKinley and Julia Preston, U.S. Can’t Trace Visitors on Expired Visas, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2009, at A1 (noting that over 40% of the undocumented migrants
were previously documented and overstayed). Although overstay rates among guest
workers are lower now than they were in the past, historically, high overstay rates
among guest workers were a primary contributor to the size of the undocumented
population. Philip L. Martin and Michael S. Teitelbaum, The Mirage of Mexican
Guest Workers, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov./ Dec. 2001 at 117. The size of the
undocumented population (of twelve million) is taken from the work of Douglas
Massey, a sociologist who is a leading authority on this issue. See DOUGLAS S.
MASSEY, Borderline Madness: America’s Counterproductive Immigration Policy,
in DEBATING IMMIGRATION 129 (CAROL SWAIN, ed. 2008). Other estimates
generally indicate that there are between ten and fourteen million undocumented
persons. See DAVID A. MARTIN, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., TWILIGHT STATUSES: A
CLOSER EXAMINATION OF THE UNAUTHORIZED POPULATION (2005); JEFFREY S.
PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS:
NUMBERS AND
CHARACTERISTICS 3 (2005), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/46.pdf.
10
Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of
Immigration Law, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 809 (2007) (pointing out the difficulties of
information asymmetry); see also HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING:
THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 15–37
(2006) (pointing out a further difficulty is that even a sincere visa applicant who
promises to return to his home country may change his mind once he has been in the
U.S. for a period of time).

8

challenge, this Article recommends what economists popularly term
“hostage-taking,” that is, the visa applicant should have to post a bond. 11
While a bonding proposal initially may seem radical, bonding has a
long heritage in many aspects of the common law. 12 Moreover, the U.S.
government is already heavily involved with bonding regimes on its overseas
military bases, albeit indirectly. Immigration authorities in the Middle East
typically require guest workers to post bonds. In keeping with these
requirements, Halliburton, the military contractor fills many of the
housekeeping positions on American military bases in the Gulf by posting
bonds for guest workers. 13 Yet despite the obvious applicability of bonding
to U.S immigration challenges, 14 it is curious that there has been little

11

The term “hostage taking” comes from the economics literature. See Oliver
E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73
AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983). In this particular context, the pejorative term “hostage”
refers to a government’s ability to hold hostage something of value to the alien until
he exits the country.
12
See, e.g., THE LAW OF MISCELLANEOUS AND COMMERCIAL SURETY BONDS
(American Bar Association, eds. TODD C. KAZLOW AND BRUCE C. KING 2001)
(leading text on bonding in the commercial context); Eric Helland and Alexander
Tabarrok, The Fugitive: Evidence on Public Versus Private Law Enforcement from
Bail Jumping, 47 J. LAW & ECON. 93 (2004) (discussing the effectiveness of bail
bonding systems in diverse contexts); Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: II.
Preliminary Preceedings: Bail, 37 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 311 (2008)
(summary of the current law on bail bonding in the criminal law context).
13
Halliburton typically hires South Asians for these positions. Nizar Latif,
Iraqis Angry at Loss of Jobs to Asians, THE NATIONAL (Nov. 7, 2009)
http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20091108/FOREIGN/711079
862/1135.
14
Indeed, bonding is currently utilized in limited circumstances in the INA.
INA § 212(d)(3)(A)(2006) (“The Attorney General shall prescribe conditions,
including the exaction of such bonds as may be necessary, to control and regulate the
admission and return of inadmissible aliens applying for temporary admission under
this paragraph.”); INA § 213 (2006) (regarding admission of aliens upon giving
bond or undertaking and its return upon permanent departure); INA § 214 (2006)
(“The admission to the United States of any alien as a nonimmigrant shall be for
such time and under such conditions as the Attorney General may by regulations
prescribe, including when he deems necessary the giving of a bond with sufficient
surety in such sum and containing such conditions as the Attorney General shall
prescribe . . .”). See also STEPHEN LEGOMSKY AND CRISTINA RODRIGUEZ,
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY 651, 818 (5th ed. 2009); THOMAS ALEINIKOFF,
ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 748 (6th ed. 2003).
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discussion of broader bonding proposals. 15 This Article is an effort to begin
that dialogue.
Admittedly, there are problems with bonding regimes in the U.S.
context, which justify the utilization of the “tragic choice” metaphor. In a
country resolutely committed in its historical Ellis Island metaphors to the
notion that it opens its borders to deserving migrants, 16 regardless of their
socio-economic status, bonding systems may reinforce a view that visas are
being “sold.” However, immigration law already routinely uses market-based
mechanisms to screen rich migrants. The question becomes why poor
migrants should not have similar opportunities. The real issue is not the
bonding requirement, but rather the absence of opportunities in developing
countries for poor people to access credit facilities to finance bonds.
While proposals for visa-bonding of guest workers are rarely
discussed, skeptics of bonding regimes cite the Dickensian free-for-all that
preceded modern immigration law. 17 Fully half of white migrants in the early
days of the Republic were bonded by their employers as a condition of their
passage with the implicit cooperation of the government, which enforced the
bonds. Upon arrival, migrants labored to pay off bonds in slave-like
conditions; in contemporary times, bonded workers in the Gulf have been
described as indentured servants. 18 Yet these concerns seem strangely out of
15

The exceptions are Jeffrey Manns and Peter Schuck. Manns’ exploration of
the role of gatekeepers in immigration enforcement includes a brief discussion of
bonding. Jeffrey Manns, Private Monitoring of Gatekeepers: The Case of
Immigration Enforcement, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 887, 889-90 (2006). Peter Schuck
also briefly discusses bonding. Peter H. Schuck, INS Detention and Removal: A
“White Paper”, 11 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 667, 682-85 (1997).
16
Aristide Zolberg’s details the evolution of this Ellis Island metaphor of the
“deserving migrant” in his Introduction. ARISTIDE ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN:
IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE FASHIONING OF AMERICA 1-24 (2007).
17
Ayelet Shachar is a prominent skeptic. See AYELET SCHACHAR, THE
BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY 22 (2009).
18
See ERIC FONER, GIVE ME LIBERTY Introduction (2004) (for a discussion of
early white migrants) and Human Rights Watch, Swept Under the Rug: Abuses
Against Domestic Workers Around the World, (July 27, 2006) (for a discussion of
the working conditions of bonded workers in the Middle East). Although indentured
laborers often worked under difficult conditions, indentured servitude was distinct,
of course, from slavery. Foner’s text famously elucidates the distinction between the
two institutions. In modern times, the distributive justice questions have particular
resonance given that poor bonded migrants are disproportionately likely to be racial
minorities. This is certainly the case in the Middle East where bonded migrants are
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place in the modern U.S., where bonds are enforceable with appropriate
human rights protections. Moreover, critics face an undeniable irony: the
average migrant worker sees the value of her labor jump five times in the
U.S. 19 By lowering overstay rates, bonding systems may improve U.S. labor
market access for poor migrants whose welfare motivates distributive justice
critiques in the first place. 20 Thus, the goal should be to pursue transparent
bonding proposals, while mitigating distributive justice concerns. One
solution would be to provide incentives for employers to finance bonds.
However, there will always be worthy applicants who cannot find employers
that will post bonds on their behalves. 21 Thus, applicants should be able to
finance bonds on their own steam. 22

comprised almost entirely of South Asians. Critics have raised the prospect of a
separate underclass of poor migrants. In the U.S. context although bonding regimes
are not yet widely utilized, this concern of a separate underclass has particular
resonance and is raised in several law review articles, especially in the context of
guest worker programs. For skeptical discussions of guest worker programs more
generally, see MOTOMURA, supra note 10 at 15–37. For more targeted critiques of
guest worker programs, see Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S.
CAL. L. REV. 503 (2007); Cristina M. Rodríguez, Guest Workers and Integration:
Toward a Theory of What Immigrants and Americans Owe One Another, U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 219 (2007).
19
See Michael Clemens, et al., The Place Premium: Wage Differences for
Identical Workers Across the U.S. Border, Working Paper 55, available at
http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/16352 (Dec. 2008) (discussing the
“place premium,” namely the wage gain accruing to foreign workers who arrive in
the U.S. and finding that migration has a much more immediate impact on poverty
alleviation than any other policy since the wage differentials between the U.S. and
most developing countries are so great)
20
Indeed, bonding proposals have recently gained currency in Britain for
precisely this reason. For example, South Asian lobby groups have advocated
bonding proposals on the grounds that it would improve access for South Asians to
Britain. The Times Online, Britons Face Jail If Relatives Overstay Their Visa (June
25,
2008),
available
at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article4211653.ece.
21
See National Labor Migration Policy for Sri Lanka, available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/migrant/download/mpolicy_srilanka_en
.pdf. This finding justifies the emphasis on institutional innovations that allow guest
workers to finance their own bonds independent of finding willing employers.
22
This distributive justice intuition – namely enhancing access to visas - is
supported by the work of a number of leading political theorists. See, e.g., JOSEPH H.
CARENS, CULTURE, CITIZENSHIP, AND COMMUNITY: A CONTEXTUAL EXPLORATION
OF JUSTICE AS EVENHANDEDNESS (2000); DUAL NATIONALITY, SOCIAL RIGHTS AND
FEDERAL CITIZENSHIP IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE: THE REINVENTION OF CITIZENSHIP
(RANDALL HANSEN & PATRICK WEIL eds., 2002); JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION 136, 140
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As recent history in developed country markets has shown, the road
to extending credit to the poor is rife with potential pitfalls. 23 Indeed, the
current state of credit markets for poor people in the developing world is not
unlike the market here in the U.S. before protections for poor borrowers
proliferated at the federal and state levels. 24 Although it may not be widely
recognized outside of specialist circles, the poor have long been able to
borrow. 25 Even in the early days of the Great Depression, there was a
thriving market of black market money lenders. 26 The problem is that the
poor’s financiers typically operate in the black market, extracting terms that
are unjustifiable in a modern market economy. Money lenders have long
been understood to demand onerous terms; one need only consider the
biblical condemnation of the abuses of money lenders in Jersusalem’s
temple. 27
In modern times, this is how South Asian guest workers who post
bonds to work in the Middle East often finance their bonds; they execute
loan contracts with local money lenders. These money lenders may enforce
contracts with implicit threats of violence. 28 Their threats are credible.
Indeed, Nepalese farmers borrow money for fertilizer by sometimes pledging
their daughters as “collateral;” their daughters work as indentured laborers to
the money lenders until the loan is paid off. 29 The same Nepalese farmer
may need a loan to underwrite a bond for a work visa in Dubai, where he can
(WARREN F. SCHWARTZ ed., 1995); James Woodward, Commentary: Liberalism
and Migration, in FREE MOVEMENT: ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE TRANSNATIONAL
MIGRATION OF PEOPLE AND OF MONEY 59, 82 (BRIAN BARRY & ROBERT E. GOODIN
eds., 1992).
23
The Introduction to Barr and Blank’s text makes this point particularly well.
INSUFFICIENT FUNDS: SAVINGS, ASSETS, CREDIT, AND BANKING AMONG LOWINCOME HOUSEHOLDS (MICHAEL BARR AND R.M. BLANK, eds. 2009).
24
See PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA:
INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY (1974).
25
Jill Lepore, Annals of Finance: “I.O.U.,” THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 13, 2009
at 34.
26
See COLEMAN, supra note 24
27
Mathew 21:12 (detailing Jesus’ criticisms of money lenders in the temple).
28
See generally, DARYL COLLINS, ET AL., PORTFOLIOS OF THE POOR: HOW
THE WORLD’S POOR LIVE ON $2 A DAY (2009).
29
Ashoka, the global association of social entrepreneurs has widely
publicized the plight of Nepalese girls who are pledged to moneylenders as
indentured servants. See Gregg, Tully, Freeing Nepali Girls from Indentured
Servitude, http://www.changemakers.com/enus/node/7822/ (last visited Jan. 12,
2010).
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increase his earnings several-fold. While it would be tragic to deny him this
opportunity, in the absence of access to credit in a transparent, regulated
setting, he may find himself making a similarly tragic choice that involves
pledging his daughter.
This is the world as it currently is for the developing country poor
who seek financing. This Article is an attempt to map a trajectory to a world
as it could be. Our distributive justice commitments counsel providing
enhanced access to visas through enhanced access to financing.
Simultaneously, we must set a certain threshold of protections that should
exist for a proposal to be acceptable; at a minimum, financing for poor
migrants must be obtained in a law-bound context. 30 One could hardly be
comfortable with migrants financing the bonds that underlie their visas to the
U.S. in the black market, with a shadowy world of money lenders and
coyotes extending loans (although ironically, this is precisely what transpires
now, when undocumented workers borrow money through deferred
financing from the same coyotes who surreptitiously transport them across
the border). Although there is virtually nothing in the legal scholarship 31 on
either secured or unsecured lending at the “bottom of the pyramid” in
developing countries, 32 a realistic assessment of the current state of lending
30

Of course, even when financing occurs in the context of a law-bound
framework, a range of problems may occur as the recent global financial crisis has
reminded us. If the experience of student borrowers and poor sub-prime borrowers
in the U.S. is any guide, prospective guest workers could be particularly susceptible
to predatory lending practices. This reinforces the need for vigorous regulation of
lenders.
For a summary of the issues in this regard, see
http://www.newamerica.net/programs/education_policy/higher_ed_watch/student_lo
an_scan
and
http://www.naacp.org/news/press/2009-03-13/index.htmdal
(summarizing lawsuits on predatory lending).
31
Michael Barr and Ronald Mann’s work on financial services for lowincome Americans is a model of the type of work that would be helpful on financial
services for the developing country poor. See, e.g., Chapters 3 and 8 in BARR AND
BLANK, supra note 23. However, there is minimal work in the legal scholarship on
lending to the poor in the developing world. An exception is Hal S. Scott, The State
of Banking in Developing Countries in ESSAYS ON COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL AND
CONSUMER LAW: PAPERS FROM THE FOURTH BIENNIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW (DONALD B.
KING ED., WILLIAM S. HEIN & CO., INC., 1992), which includes a brief discussion on
the issue.
32
The term “bottom of the pyramid” was first used by President Roosevelt in
one of his famous fireside chats during the Great Depression. It has gained currency
among development economists who study poverty in the developing world. See
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to the poor (as discussed in the development finance literature) confirms that
the prospects for formal financial institutions extending credit are not
promising. Given that cash diversion is a particular risk in the informal
economies that are typically pervasive in developing countries, formal
financial institutions generally follow the maxim “no collateral: no loan.”33
For the poor, this has generally resulted in “no loan.” 34 Moreover, the legal
systems in many developing countries do not reliably enforce loan contracts.
This only exacerbates the difficulties of formal financial intermediation for
the poor. The question becomes: what would it take to create incentives for
bankers in the developing world to finance visa-bonds in the formal sector?
To elucidate this question, the author conducted a qualitative field study of
guest workers and their bankers.
The key move is to mitigate the inability of bankers to enforce what
this Article terms “loan-for-visa-bond contracts,” that is the loan agreements
underlying the financing that migrants will use to pay their bonds to obtain
visas. This can be accomplished by making loan compliance a condition of
visa-renewal. That is, the U.S. government will commit to bankers that they
generally C.K. PRAHALAD, THE FORTUNE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PYRAMID (2006)
(popularizing the term and advocating market-based solutions to poverty); Stuart
Hart, Capitalism at the Crossroads (2005) (same); but see Aneel Karnani, The
Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid: A Mirage, 49/4 Cal. Management J. 90, 111
(2007) (pointing out the deficiencies of the term).
33
In this particular instance, I utilize the term “collateral” here in its
traditional sense, namely as property that is pledged as security against a debt.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 278 (8th ed. 2004). “Security” is "collateral given
or pledged to guarantee the fulfillment of an obligation; especially, the assurance that
a creditor will be repaid . . . any money or credit extended to a debtor." Id. at 1384.
Generally, I will generally use the terms security and collateral interchangeably in
this article. Of course, the utilization of the term collateral in the phrase “visa as
collateral” is metaphorical rather than literal. The visa is not collateral in the
traditional sense that is something of value pledged to the lender that can be enforced
against in the event of default on a loan. The visa cannot be possessed by the lender.
Instead, the loan is “secured” by the value of the visa-license to the borrower, the
promise of the government to revoke the visa if the borrower defaults, and the
possibility that the lender may recoup some of the loan proceeds even in the event
that the borrower defaults if the lender aids in the process of finding the noncompliant alien.
34
Phillip Bond & Ashok Rai, Collateral Substitutes in Microfinance (2002)
available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/seminars/develop/tdw02/rai-021118.pdf.
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will only renew a visa if an applicant is properly servicing the loan that
underlies the bond associated with the visa. In exchange, the bank will
commit to thoroughly evaluate the applicant’s risk profile as a condition of
extending the loan. In so doing, the proposal seriously mitigates the
challenges of enforcing loan contracts, while simultaneously mitigating the
challenges that the U.S. government currently experiences in evaluating the
risk profiles of potential migrants. Notably, these visas would be modeled 35
on other government licenses that function as collateral-like devices. 36 In
the world as it could be, labor mobility would have become bankable in the
formal sector.
How would the proposal work in practice? While the proposal
clearly has broader applicability, I am concerned here primarily with guest
worker visas. The guest worker provisions of the INA would be revised to
codify a punitive bond arrangement that will increase the cost of a breach for
a visa-recipient who overstays. In the new system, the visa officer in the
local Embassy would retain her critical role as a primary gatekeeper, but this
role would be supplemented by a bank acting as a secondary gatekeeper. To
this end, rather than issuing a visa, the visa officer would issue the
prospective visa-recipient with a provisional “visa license.” This visa license
would signify conditional approval, contingent on a demonstrated ability to
post a bond. The prospective visa-recipient would then present her
conditional visa-license to a bank as part of her loan application. By
providing only conditional approval, the U.S. would be seeking further
assurance from the bank that the prospective visa-recipient has a good risk
profile. In the event that the guest worker later defaults (on her loan or on the
terms of her visa) putting the bond at risk, the bank will be properly
motivated to find the defaulting guest worker. The amount of the bond that is
recouped will be indexed to how quickly the bank is able to provide evidence
that the non-compliant alien has exited the U.S.; the bank or its agent will
have incentives to either “snitch” or encourage the alien to self-deport.

35

The term is Blocher’s play on Reich’s famous term “the new property”. See
Joseph Blocher, Reputation as Property in Virtual Economies, 118 YALE L.J. Pocket
Part 120 (2009); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
See Eleanor Brown, Visa as New “New Property,” (Work in Progress).
36
Taxi-cab medallions, for example, are among the licenses that are routinely
used in secured transactions. See, e.g., Katrina Wyman, Is Bentham Right?: The
Case of New York City Taxicab Medallions (on file with author).
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I critiques the current
approach of U.S. immigration law to screening guest workers and lays out
the bonding proposal. Part II discusses the crux of the problem – motivating
third parties to finance visa-bonds. Crucially, if appropriately designed,
these visas will constitute the ideal type of collateral-like device, in that they
will be highly valuable to the borrower, but less valuable to the lender. Part
III further elucidates why visa-as-collateral would work. Developing country
legal systems may have no credibility with their banking sectors. Banks
make deals, that is, specific accommodations for individual borrowers, rather
than relying on rules. 37 In contrast, the American government is considered a
credible threat-maker. Banks will not have cut deals because they will be
secure in the knowledge that the U.S. will enforce the rules and refuse to
renew a visa in the event of a visa-bond loan default. Part IV focuses on a
primary advantage of the proposal, namely the outsourcing of both the
screening and enforcement function to bankers. The Conclusion addresses
the concern that visa-as-collateral constitutes an unseemly concession to
commodification 38 since market-based mechanisms of allocation are
considered inappropriate in distributing certain quasi-public goods. 39 This is
a classic instance of what I term “facilitative commodification,” with the
classic trade-offs of proposals that seek to improve the opportunity sets of
the poor, while simultaneously improving compliance. This proposal
accomplishes immigration law goals in a manner that reduces “subterfuges,”
and renders the choices made somewhat less “tragic,” particularly for the
poor.

37

I am indebted to Lant Pritchett for pointing this out to me. See HallwardDreimer, et al., Deals versus Rules: Uncertainty in Policy Implementation in Africa
(Feb. 27, 2009)(unpublished manuscript, National Bureau for Economic Research).
38
See MARGARET RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996) (critique of
“universal commodification,” namely the tendency to judge everything that we value
according to the willingness of individuals to pay for it in the marketplace).
39
I recognize that I am utilizing the term “public good” in an unconventional
sense in describing visas, and I am borrowing this utilization from the RETHINKING
COMMODIFICATION (MARTHA ERTMAN AND JOAN WILLIAMS, eds 2005.), See Martha
M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams, Preface: Freedom, Equality, and the Many Futures
of Commodification, 1-7; Margaret Jane Radin and Madhavi Sunder, Introduction:
The Subject and Object of Commodification, 8-29 in RETHINKING
COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE (eds. MARTHA M.
ERTMAN and JOAN C. WILLIAMS, 2005).
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Part I: IMPROVING SCREENING: BONDING AT THE BOTTOM
OF THE PYRAMID
A. Disproportionate Emphasis on Due Diligence and Assurances
Consider the following fact pattern regularly encountered by a Kuwaiti
immigration officer: a South Asian worker submits an application for a
temporary guest worker visa that would allow him to take a house-keeping
position on an American military base. The Kuwaiti immigration officer is
concerned about two potential difficulties with the application. First, the
prospective migrant may overstay her visa. Second, the applicant may
impose welfare costs on the state.
Kuwait regularly requires that a bond be posted with the Kuwaiti
government as a condition of entry for guest workers. Notably, the bond will
be forfeited if the guest worker fails to meet any one of three conditions: (1)
providing accurate information about historical behavior, that is, her past
record of law abidance; (2) abiding by the visa terms, including a
requirement that she not impose welfare costs on the Kuwaiti government
and (3) exiting Kuwait in the prescribed time period. 40 Since the military
employs contractors who utilize guest workers in Kuwait, the American
government is regularly involved with such bonding arrangements, albeit
often indirectly. 41

40

Typically, the amounts that South Asian guest workers pay in relation to
their earning power in their countries of origin are astronomical. For example, the
average bond is often equivalent to the annual salary of the average Sri Lankan
worker. Human Rights Watch, Exported and Exposed: Abuses Against Sri Lankan
Domestic Workers in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon, and the United Arab Emirates
(Nov. 13 2007) at iv.noting that bonds are typically prohibitive for the average Sri
Lankan in relation to their PPP (purchasing power parity). The PPP of an average
citizen in Sri Lanka is USD 4,460. PPP is often utilized by development economists
to reflect the real purchasing power of an average citizen in relation to a standardized
basket of goods (food, shelter etc.) World Bank, Gross National Income Per Capita,
Atlas
Method
and
PPP,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf. The
average bond appears to exceed the amount needed to deter non-compliance; it may
include excess (and perhaps illicit) rents for labor brokers and government officials.
41
Even though the U.S. government typically does not post the bond, it
usually retains a contractor such as Halliburton who in turn retains a labor broker
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Now let us move to the United States and consider an American
immigration officer facing a similar fact pattern. The applicant for a
temporary guest worker visa begs for favorable consideration, seeking to
distinguish herself from similarly situated applicants who have been noncompliant in the past. 42 Although rarely articulated in this manner, U.S.
immigration law generally addresses this challenge by utilizing a two-fold
strategy that is familiar from Anglo-American contract law.
First, in an effort to deal with the challenges of obtaining reliable
information concerning the applicant’s historical behavior, U.S. immigration
officials conduct “due diligence.” A web of laws allow the government to
who posts the bond or ensures that such bond is posted by the South Asian guest
worker. Given that the guest worker is typically unbanked with no access to credit;
he generally borrows this money from the labor broker who arranges his visa and his
job. He signs a contract under which his salary is paid to the labor broker until the
load is repaid. It appears that implicit interest rate is very high. Interview with Nasra
Shah, University of Kuwait.
42
The reader should be aware that the guest worker visas that are discussed in
this Article raise profound questions of justice, which are beyond the scope of this
paper and should be the subject of a later work. There is an ongoing and welldocumented tension between the state’s interest in the provision of low-cost labor
and its concern with the protection of human rights more generally. These concerns
include but are not limited to the following: whether the presence of a large-scale
population of temporary guests institutionalizes the exclusion of noncitizens from
the constitutional mainstream, undermines political community, and denigrates the
value of citizenship; whether these programs undermine wages and workplace
protections for both guests and native workers; and whether such programs
legitimate the application of a broader “trade paradigm” to human beings that
commodifies labor. I am fully cognizant of these concerns, which provide fertile
ground for further work. The following is a partial list of references that address
these concerns. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 56–61 (1983) (opposing guest worker programs on the
grounds that they do not conform to the liberal egalitarian principles that govern full
membership in a just state); see also CANADIAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AT THE
TURN OF THE CENTURY: EXEMPLARY ESSAYS (R. BEINER and W. NORMAN eds.,
2000); JOSEPH H. CARENS, CULTURE, CITIZENSHIP, AND COMMUNITY:
A
CONTEXTUAL EXPLORATION OF JUSTICE AS EVENHANDEDNESS (2000); DUAL
NATIONALITY, SOCIAL RIGHTS AND FEDERAL CITIZENSHIP IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE:
THE REINVENTION OF CITIZENSHIP (RANDALL HANSEN & PATRICK WEIL eds., 2002);
Louis Michael Seidman, Fear and Loathing at the Border, in JUSTICE IN
IMMIGRATION 136, 140 (WARREN F. SCHWARTZ ed., 1995); James Woodward,
Commentary: Liberalism and Migration, in FREE MOVEMENT: ETHICAL ISSUES IN
THE TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION OF PEOPLE AND OF MONEY 59, 82 (BRIAN BARRY
& ROBERT E. GOODIN eds., 1992). For a discussion of the impact of low-skilled
alien workers on wages of citizen workers, see generally GEORGE BORJAS, FRIENDS
OR STRANGERS: THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE U.S. ECONOMY (1990) (noting
the disproportionate impact on the most disadvantaged, including urban residents
and African Americans). See also MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING supra note
10; Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, supra note 18; Cristina M.
Rodríguez, Guest Workers and Integration, supra note 18.
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ascertain historical and likely future behavior of any visa applicant, including
prospective guest workers (by mandating, for example, in certain instances
that the applicant must provide evidence of past good behavior such police
reports and the evidence of likely good behavior in the future such as assets
in the home country to which the visa applicant is likely to return). 43 Second,
in an effort to buttress the accuracy of the applicant’s assertions regarding
historical behavior, it also asks the applicant to provide assurances and that
the information provided is accurate. 44 In the event that the information
43

See INA §§ 101, 214 (a)(1) (“The admission to the United States of any
alien as a nonimmigrant shall be for such time and under such conditions as the
Attorney General may by regulations prescribe . . . to insure that at the expiration of
such time or upon failure to maintain the status under which he was admitted, or to
maintain any status subsequently acquired under section 248 , such alien will depart
from the United States. [ . . . ]; (b) Every alien 10/ (other than a nonimmigrant
described in subparagraph (L) or (V) of section 101(a)(15), and other than a
nonimmigrant described in any provision of section 101(a)(15)(H)(i) except
subclause (b1) of such section) shall be presumed to be an immigrant until he
establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer, at the time of application for a
visa, and the immigration officers, at the time of application for admission, that he is
entitled to a nonimmigrant status under section 101(a)(15) (ii) (a) having a residence
in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning who is coming
temporarily to the United States to perform agricultural labor or services, as defined
by the Secretary of Labor in regulations and including agricultural labor defined in
section 3121(g) of 3bbb/ the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, agriculture as defined
in section 3(f) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 203(f)), and the
pressing of apples for cider on a farm, of a temporary or seasonal nature [ . . . ]”).
Although the guidance from the State Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs does
not appear to contain a specific reference to guest worker visas, the reference to the
obligations placed on other temporary admittees may serve as a guide. See, e.g.,
U.S. Department of State, Visitor Visa- Business and Pleasure, available at
http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/types/types_1262.html, (“The presumption in the
law is that every visitor visa applicant is an intending immigrant. Therefore,
applicants for visitor visas must overcome this presumption by demonstrating that:
The purpose of their trip is to enter the U.S. for business, pleasure, or medical
treatment; That they plan to remain for a specific, limited period; Evidence of funds
to cover expenses in the United States; Evidence of compelling social and economic
ties abroad; and That they have a residence outside the U.S. as well as other binding
ties that will insure their return abroad at the end of the visit.”).
44
See DS-156: Department of State Nonimmigrant Visa Application,
available at https://evisaforms.state.gov/ds156.asp, (“41. I certify that I have read
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shared by the migrant in the due diligence process turns out later to be false,
the penalty is usually visa-revocation. 45 However, given the high overstay
rates among temporary visitors, 46 it is apparent that the traditional emphasis
on due diligence and assurances, and the threat of visa revocation in the face
of false statements, has not been effective.
B. A Potential Solution: The Kuwaiti Approach
This is a quintessential case of information asymmetry, in which one
party to the transaction knows more about a relevant fact than the other
party. The applicant is highly likely to know more than the immigration
officer about facts which are critical to determining whether she should
receive a visa. Going forward, I will refer to the party with lesser
information, who is assessing the reliability of such information, as the
“gatekeeper” and the party with better information, who seeks to convince
the gatekeeper of her trustworthiness as the “applicant.” 47 The economics
literature provides an obvious solution to problems of information

and understood all the questions set forth in this application and the answers I have
furnished on this form are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. I
understand that any false or misleading statement may result in the permanent
refusal of a visa or denial of entry into the United States. I understand that
possession of a visa does not automatically entitle the bearer to enter the United
States of America upon arrival at a port of entry if he or she is found inadmissible.”).
45
Although the guidance from the State Department’s Bureau of Consular
Affairs does not appear to contain a specific reference to guest worker visas, the
warnings to other temporary admittees of the possibility of visa-revocation may
serve as a guide. U.S. Department of State, Visitor Visa- Business and Pleasure,
available
at
http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/types/types_1262.html
(“Misrepresentation of a Material Facts, or Fraud: Attempting to obtain a visa by the
willful misrepresentation of a material fact, or fraud, may result in the permanent
refusal of a visa or denial of entry into the United States.”).
46
McKinley and Preston, supra note 9.
47
In the Kuwaiti fact pattern, if the American military employer posts the
bond itself, the Kuwaiti government has essentially outsourced the gate-keeping
function to the American military. However, the American military is likely to subcontract this function to a labor/bond-broker (that is, a private company which refers
workers and assumes the bond-posting responsibility), and in so doing, outsource the
gate-keeping function to the labor/bond-broker.
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asymmetry and it is the Kuwaiti answer: prospective migrants should be
required to post bonds. 48
There are two distinct situations in which the gate keeper is likely to be
at an informational disadvantage. The first situation involves historical facts
concerning the past behavior of the applicant, for example, whether the
applicant has complied with laws or imposed welfare costs on the state in the
past. The second situation involves predicting the applicant’s future
behavior. Specifically, will she abide by the terms of her visa, exiting by the
prescribed date and not imposing welfare costs on the government in the
interim?
In the ensuing analysis, I distinguish between information regarding
historical behavior and information predictive of future behavior. Why
distinguish between the two? In one sense, they are inextricably intertwined - the historical behavior of a visa applicant may well be a predictor of future
behavior (indeed, one could imagine making this case statistically).
However, the applicant’s historical behavior can be differentiated from her
future behavior because future commitments necessarily involve moral
hazard.

48

For a good high-level introduction to the role of bonds in the legal
scholarship, David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104
HARV. L. REV. 375 (1990) Charny discusses two other types of non-legal sanctions
including reputational sanctions and the loss of psychic goods such as self-esteem.
In a previous paper, I discussed both these typologies of non-legal sanctions in the
context of immigration. See Eleanor Brown, Outsourcing Immigration Compliance,
77 Fordham Law Review 2475 (2009).
Another good summary of the use of bonds in resolving the problems of
information asymmetry is Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing
Transactions, 87 GEO. L. J. 2225 (1999). Jeffrey Manns briefly discusses the
potential advantages of bonds in the immigration context. Jeffrey Manns, supra note
15. For discussions of bonding in the context of gatekeeping, see also, Stephen J.
Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. Rev. 916 (1998); Stephen J.
Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL. L. REV.
279 (2000); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 54 (1986). Papers which discuss
economic models of bonding arrangements include Klein & Leffler, The Role of
Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615
(1981); L. Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. BUS. 27 (1980); and
the seminal Williamson article, supra note 11, at 519.
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In light of this, ideally, any device that seeks to mitigate the challenges
of information asymmetry will not only increase the applicant’s incentive to
be honest about past behavior (since the applicant will have reason to believe
that she will be caught lying by the gatekeeper); it will also have an ongoing
effect, so that the applicant is continuously motivated to abide by her visa
terms in the future. Notably, the foregoing Kuwaiti bonding arrangement
accomplishes both these goals. The bond many be forfeited either in the
event that the guest worker is found to have lied about historical behavior or
in the event that she does not comply with the conditions of her visa in the
future, and in both cases, deportation ensues as well. In the American fact
pattern, unlike the Kuwaiti fact pattern, there is no ongoing mechanism of
motivating future compliance other than the threat of visa-revocation and
subsequent deportation (which lack credibility particularly if the likelihood
of deportation is low as a practical matter).
C. Designing a Bond
Let us take a moment to consider the ideal characteristics of a bond.
A bond should be designed asymmetrically so that if the gatekeeper executes
on the bond, the visa recipient would suffer a significant loss even as the
gatekeeper realizes an insignificant gain. 49
First we begin with the recognition that the greater the potential loss
for forfeiture of the bond, the less likely it is that the applicant will provide
inaccurate information. Notably, this is likely to be the case whether or not
the information is historical or relates to the likely future compliance of the
49

The ideal “hostage” should constrain the visa-recipient but not tempt the
gatekeeper. The concept is often captured in the metaphor of the “ugly princess”
whose father offers her as a bond to the king of a warring kingdom as evidence of his
intention to abide by a peace treaty. Given familial ties, she is much more valuable
to her father than she is to the other king. See Williamson, supra note 14. The ugly
princess has since been updated to the “puny prince.” See Robert Scott, A Relational
Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 930 (1986). Other writers
have recognized the importance on constraints on gatekeeper inclinations to act
opportunistically, emphasizing reputation as the primary constraint on opportunistic
behavior. See, e.g., Niloy Bose & Richard Cothren, Asymmetric Information and
Loan Contracts in a Neoclassical Growth Model, 29 J. MONEY, CREDIT &
BANKING 423, 429-30 (1997); Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the
Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 527 (1981); D. Gordon Smith, Venture
Capital Contracting in the Information Age, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L.
133, 138-40 (1998).
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applicant. If it relates to historical facts, the prospect of a future loss in the
event that the information is later found to be inaccurate should create
incentives for the applicant to be compliant. With respect to future visa
compliance, the ongoing possibility of a loss should motivate the applicant to
ensure that her behavior is compliant. In either event, what has been termed
the bond’s “verificatory” power increases as the size of the bond increases. 50
However, as the size of the bond increases, so does the incentive for
the gatekeeper to execute on the bond in an opportunistic manner, even if the
applicant has not violated its terms. This may not seem to be a real danger in
the U.S. context, where there is transparency in immigration administration
and intermediaries who finance bonds would presumably be regulated by
some independent authority. However, in the Middle East, there have been
allegations that government officials (in collusion with broker intermediaries,
to whom guest workers sometimes pay high interest to post bonds on their
behalf) have opportunistically threatened bond-forfeiture to force the early
exit of law-abiding aliens. 51 One obvious institutional design solution to this
challenge is to ensure the establishment of a transparent mechanism with
independent judges to determine the circumstances under which forfeiture is
appropriate. While this innovation should mitigate this danger, it would still
be ideal to design a bond that reduces the incentives for the gatekeeper to act
50

Mann, supra note 48.
Human Rights Watch, Bad Dreams: Exploitation and Abuse of Migrant
Workers in Saudi Arabia (July 13, 2004). A further challenge is that bonds have
sometimes not been returned, even when guest workers have met the conditions of
their visas. The likelihood of such abuses even in an ostensibly law-bound regime is
not low. Indeed, a similar problem occurred in the now-infamous Bracero
(“farmhand”) guest-worker program, under which hundreds of thousands of Mexican
guest workers travelled to the U.S. as agricultural workers between the 1942 and
1964. As an incentive to encourage return to Mexico, the U.S. government retained
Social Security contributions, with a commitment that payments would be made to
guest workers upon their return home to Mexico. However, such payments were
made to many guest workers only after decades of litigation. For a general
discussion of the program’s failings, see Douglas S. Massey & Zai Liang, The LongTerm Consequences of a Temporary Worker Program: The US Bracero Experience,
8 POPULATION RES. & POL’Y REV. 199 (1989). The program was inaugurated under
a bilateral agreement with Mexico during World War II to meet critical agricultural
labor shortages and ultimately involved widespread visa overstays and deportations.
See KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION
AND THE I.N.S. (1992); BARBARA A. DRISCOLL, THE TRACKS NORTH: THE
RAILROAD BRACERO PROGRAM OF WORLD WAR II, at 53–55 (1999); ERNESTO
GALARZA, MERCHANTS OF LABOR (1964).
51
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opportunistically even while it continues to provide a sufficient deterrent to
the visa-holder.
There are other institutional design innovations that might lower the
likelihood of opportunism by gatekeepers. For example, in the contracting
context, the literature discusses asymmetrically punitive bonds, in which the
applicant posts a bond which has value that is particular to her (and is not
likely to be realized at as high a price in the marketplace). Indeed, one might
think of a range of items that have some peculiar personal value to the alien
(such as family heirlooms, inherited land et al.), and as such, might meet
these criteria. 52 In so doing, the bond becomes far more valuable to the
applicant than to the gatekeeper.
The larger point is that an appropriately designed bond should be not
merely compensatory, but also punitive. That is, the loss to the applicant
should exceed the gain from providing inaccurate information (either as it
relates to historical information or predicted future compliance) divided by
the probability that such inaccuracy would later be discovered.
D. The Implications of the Involvement of Financial Intermediaries
Drawing on insights from the scholarship on contracts, one could
imagine a number of bond-design innovations that would ensure that the
bond is close to perfectly punitive. In the next section, to mitigate
distributive justice concerns, I propose that the government should provide
an incentive for third-party financial intermediaries to finance the bonds in a
transparent manner. An additional advantage of this approach is that bond

52

For a discussion of this type of property, see Margaret Jane Radin, Property
and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959-61 (1982) (arguing that some "objects
are closely bound up with personhood because they are part of the way we constitute
ourselves as continuing personal entities in the world" and providing examples of "a
wedding ring, a portrait, an heirloom, or a house"). There are also other institutional
innovations which might be applicable. For example, Mann, supra note 48, discusses
interlocking bond arrangements in which “the process for forfeiting the bonds is
structured so that the lender effectively posts its reputation as a bond against
improper execution of the bond posted by the borrower; the result is an interlocking
verification arrangement, with each party posting a bond to the other.” Such an
arrangement would perhaps have greater applicability if the government outsourced
the gate-keeping function to some other entity (such as in the Kuwaiti example
above).
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financiers will have incentives to ensure that the bonds are appropriately
punitive so as to mitigate the risk of default (on both the visa and the loan).
Generally, bond financiers will have incentives to develop the
appropriate innovations in bond-design. Indeed, a preliminary review of the
scholarship on financing arrangements at the bottom of the pyramid indicates
that financial intermediaries (often working in conditions of informality, and
indeed, even illegality) have a range of mechanisms of estimating and
pricing risk, and enforcing credit terms. 53 Some of these mechanisms of
enforcement would undoubtedly be impermissible in a transparent, lawbound bond-financing program. Nevertheless, this literature supports the
point that financial-intermediaries at the bottom of the pyramid like
conventional financiers are able to create innovative devices for constraining
risk such as hedging by spreading their loans among different populations.
For example, money lenders will make loans to factory workers and farmers
as opposed to only farmers, since farmers might all be similarly unable to
service their loans in the event of an unanticipated event such as a drought.
Indeed, in motivating financial intermediaries to finance visa-bonds, the
government in essence may be outsourcing the bond-design process. 54
There is an additional advantage of the involvement of financial
intermediaries. Bonding mechanisms provide additional information from
other sources (known in the literature as “second order” information), which
allows the gatekeeper a more reliable mechanism of determining the
accuracy of the applicant’s original assertion (“first order” information).
Notably the reliability of the second order information does not arise simply
from the fact that its source is some entity other than the applicant. Rather,
the gatekeeper is still obligated to evaluate the second order information.
This information review could be repeated iteratively until some external
entity provides independent verification of the reliability of the
information. 55 An additional advantage of such a proposal would be that
financial intermediaries would be properly motivated to independently verify
the reliability of the information as a condition of extending a loan: indeed,
this likely would constitute an essential part of their underwriting process.
53

STUART RUTHERFORD, THE POOR AND THEIR MONEY, Introduction, (2001).
Id. Nevertheless, the fact that the gatekeeper is ultimately the government
(instead of a private party) may impose practical limitations on some of these
arrangements.
55
Professor Mann makes this point. Mann, supra note 48.
54
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E. The Relative Advantages of Bonding Arrangements
1. Context Sensitivity
The due diligence process provides little context sensitivity; at times
the due diligence process over-reaches, and at other times it under-reaches,
by requiring the same information of the law-abiding prospective migrant
who is not an overstay risk as it does of the non-law-abiding prospective
migrant who is an overstay risk. The bottom line is that due diligence
processes are often ineffective and expensive.
The emphasis on assurances also appears to be ineffective. By the
time the government has realized that the information provided in the due
diligence process is inaccurate and assurances have been violated, the visa
recipient has usually disappeared into the underground economy. 56 Thus,
visa-revocation and the accompanying threat of deportation do not constitute
a meaningful penalty for many migrants when the odds of ever being caught
and deported are in their favor. 57
There is a more fundamental reason that the traditional approaches
appear to be falling short of the goals of effective screening and sanctioning.
As we have learned from the contracting context, formal legal rules are often
inadequate when sensitivity to context is important to obtain appropriate
commitments from parties with superior information. Through the
application of formal legal rules, in isolation, the government may obtain
commitments that are either disproportionate or insufficient given the special
circumstances of a situation.
For analogous reasons, it is unrealistic to expect the government to
create and extract appropriate commitments from particular applicants on a
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Martin and Teitelbaum, supra note 9; Demetrios G. Papademetriou,
Migration, 109 FOREIGN POLICY, Winter 1997-98, at 15-31; Demetrios G.
Papademetriou and Nicholas DiMarzio, A Preliminary Profile of Unapprehended
Undocumented Aliens in Northern New Jersey: A Research Note, 19 INT’L
MIGRATION REV., 746-59 (Winter 1985); Demetrios G. Papademetriou, European
Labor Migration: Consequences for the Countries of Worker Origin, 22 INT’L
STUDIES QUARTERLY 3, 377-408 (1978).
57
Martin and Teitelbaum, supra note 9.
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case-by-case basis. Indeed, even if it was possible to develop such
commitments in broad form or on a case-by-case basis, enforcement through
the legal process is likely to be prohibitively expensive. The benefit of a
bonding system is that it draws on lessons from privately developed and
enforced sanctioning arrangements that have been effective largely in the
absence of intervention from public enforcers.
2. Changing the Default Rule of Non-Enforcement
Moreover, not only do bonding systems theoretically provide context
sensitivity, they also change what I will refer to as the “default rule of nonenforcement” for visa non-compliance. Economic sociologists who study
immigration have demonstrated that documented aliens who become
undocumented are easily absorbed into dense ethnic networks that facilitate
employment in the absence of documentation. 58 Public enforcers generally
are unable to penetrate these networks without incurring extraordinary
costs. 59 Since a defaulting alien may be sanctioned only if she is found, and
she is rarely found, enforcement is the exception rather than the rule. 60
One might envision a continuum with a variety of levels of
enforcement. On one end of the continuum is the status quo; because those
who breach usually elude deportation, the current default rule is nonenforcement. 61 On the other end of the continuum is enforcement under a
58

See Alejandro Portes, Preface, in THE ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF
IMMIGRATION: ESSAYS ON NETWORKS, ETHNICITY, AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
(ALEJANDRO PORTES ed. 1995).
59
See Introduction in DAN KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS
IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2007).
60
For good reason, Manns refers to the typical undocumented alien as
“judgment proof.” Jeffrey Manns, supra note 17.
61
Following the convention in the literature on the economic sociology of
immigration, for practical purposes, I consider deportation to be synonymous with
sanctioning. One might reasonably question this assumption: if a guest worker
overstays his visa, and the host country deports him, why is this not simply an
enforcement of a contractual obligation to which the guest worker agreed in the first
place? Indeed, there is a longstanding debate in immigration law regarding whether
deportation should be viewed as a punishment at all. The question has obvious
constitutional implications, given the constitutional protections that attach when
crimes are punished. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893)
(holding that “an order of deportation is not a punishment for crime”); cf. Stephen H.
Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law, supra note 13 at 469 (arguing that
theories of deportation overlap so substantially with those of criminal punishment
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bonding system, under which full enforcement against a non-compliant alien
involves both forfeiture of the bond and deportation. One might envision an
“in between” system of partial enforcement, in which the bond is forfeited,
but the government does not deport. A bonding system changes the default
rule. Since the government can easily confiscate the bond proceeds even in
the absence of deportation, the default rule is one of partial enforcement.
This “half-way” option is arguably preferable to the status quo of nonenforcement particularly if an applicant defaulting on a bond (and
presumably on the loan) tarnishes her reputation with her home-country bank
and neighbors. 62
Moreover, with institutional design innovations, one may
substantially increase the likelihood of deportation and thus, full
enforcement. For example, as discussed in Section III below, third-party
bond-financiers may be motivated to find defaulting aliens and either report
them to the authorities or convince them to self-deport by arranging for part
of the bond to be given back to the alien, on the condition of her return
home. While some may argue that self-deportation may not fulfill the
“expressive” public function that we typically associate with conventional
sanctions (that is, communicating the deportee’s bad behavior to the
public), 63 self-deportation nevertheless accomplishes the same practical
purpose – excluding the alien from the United States. 64 Moreover, such alien
that deportation should at least sometimes be regarded as a form of punishment) and
Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts
about Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV., 1890-1935 (2000).
62
Indeed, one might even argue that as long as the government retains the
bond, the “half-way” default rule is a sanction unless an alien demonstrates
compliance.
63
While deportation is not technically considered punishment, it is clearly
understood as a shame-inducing punishment by deportees, their families and the
communities from which they originate. See also, KANSTROOM, supra note 64, at
Introduction; Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The New Path of
Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2477 (1997) (articulating the importance of the
“expressive” function of punishment); see also Tracey L. Meares, Social
Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191 (1998) (same);
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996)
(same).
64
Tamar Jacoby, a prominent conservative thinker, has noted that the selfdeportation approach is virtuous in that it represents a middle ground in the
immigration debate and bypasses the cumbersome federal bureaucracy. See WALL
ST. J Opinion Archives, Is Cannon Fodder? One GOP Congressman May Lose His
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exclusion would have been accomplished at a substantially lower cost than
typically is incurred by the government under the current system. 65
Part II: INCENTIVITIZING FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
The Proposal in Broad Outline
This section will discuss why unconventional mechanisms of
enforcing loan agreements are essential to banks in developing countries.
The proposed institutional innovations for visa-as-collateral are inspired by
these insights. 66 I begin by laying out the proposal in broad outline.

Seat for His Pro-Immigration Views, While Another Offers a Compromise,
http://www.opinionjournal.com/diary/?id=110008446 (last visited January 10,
2010). Blog postings indicate that some immigration law scholars and practitioners
are skeptical. See, e.g., Posting of Frank Sharry to ImmigrationProf Blog,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2008/07/ice-self-deport.html (July 30,
2008) (expressing skepticism); Posting of Kevin Johnson to ImmigrationProf Blog,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2008/08/government-ads.html (Aug.
13, 2008) (same).
65
See Jacoby, supra note 64.
66
The proposal is not that the visa would constitute actual collateral, but
rather that the visa would serve similar purposes for a secured lender that have
traditionally been served by secured credit. However, there are clearly significant
differences between a visa as a collateral-like device and traditional secured credit. I
briefly mention a few obvious differences. First, visas are not typically assignable.
(For a discussion of how this might theoretically be done, the software model is
useful, see, Ronald Mann Secured Credit and Software Financing, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 134, 151-53 (1999).) Thus, they would hardly constitute general intangibles in
U.C.C. terms. (See American Law Institute 2005 discussion of U.C.C. § 9-106)
Second, even if there were an assignable property right in a federally issued visa (as
a license), there would undoubtedly be concerns regarding debt servitude. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Information, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
1373, 1386-87 (1997) (noting that there are ethical lines which limit security such as
the prohibition on servitude). For a general discussion of the prohibition of debt
servitude see, see Lynn M. LoPucki & Elizabeth Warren, Secured Credit: A Systems
Approach 759-72 (2009). For a more detailed discussion of the evolution of the
prohibition on debt servitude, see COLEMAN, supra note 24 at 41, 77, 138, 147 n.11,
164-65, 218-19. Third, there would be no actual foreclosure rights. The notion of
tying loan-compliance to visa-compliance (and vice versa) brings to mind crossdefault provisions that are common in private loan contracts. While bankers

29

The U.S. government is the first gatekeeper. Assume that a visa
officer in the local Embassy approves an applicant. The visa officer would
issue the prospective visa-recipient with a provisional “visa license.” This
visa license would signify conditional approval for receiving a U.S. visa,
contingent on a demonstrated ability to post a bond.
The typical applicant would be unable to post a bond without a loan.
The prospective visa-recipient would then present her conditional visalicense to a bank in her country of origin as part of her loan application. In
this proposal, the bank becomes the second gatekeeper. By providing only
conditional approval for a visa, the U.S. government would be seeking an
assurance from this second gatekeeper that the prospective visa-recipient has
a good risk profile.
Notably, the bank will be assessing the visa-applicant’s risk profile
not only with respect to financial compliance. Although this would normally
be the bank’s primary concern, for its own underwriting purposes the bank
will also be obligated to assess the likelihood of visa-compliance.
Recall that it is unlikely that the typical applicant will be able to
service the large loan needed to post a bond, solely through employment in
her country of origin given her poor earning potential. She will only be able
to service the loan if she is able to work in the U.S. by remaining compliant
with her visa. Thus, a consideration of the likelihood of visa-compliance is
critical to the loan-underwriting process.
In order to create incentives for banks to perform this gate-keeping
function and finance the bond, the critical move is for the U.S. government
to address the bank’s own difficulties in enforcing loan contracts. To this
end, the U.S. government will tie visa compliance to loan compliance.
The U.S. government would make two commitments to the
prospective lender. First, the U.S. government would agree not to renew the
visa without being satisfied that the loan is in good standing. Thus, in the
typically insist in loan contracts that borrowers meet their regulatory obligations as a
condition of the loan, a default in the other direction (i.e., regulators insisting that
borrowers mean their loan obligations) is unusual, and unsurprisingly, I have not
been able to find a discussion of such practices (or even proposals) in the literature.
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event of a default, the bank can be secure in the knowledge that there is an
implicit penalty, namely non-renewal of a visa.
Second, if the applicant does not comply with her visa terms, thus
risking default on the bond, the bank should still be able to recoup some
significant portion of the bond if it is able to provide evidence to the U.S.
government that the defaulting visa-recipient has self-deported within some
reasonable time-period. The proportion of the bond recouped should be
indexed to the speed of self-deportation. This will provide an incentive for
banks to perform a critical function that public enforcers traditionally have
found difficult, namely, the expeditious exclusion of visa-overstayers from
the United States.
Of course banks could always “snitch” on a non-compliant alien to
the public enforcers. However, this proposal’s emphasis is on selfdeportation because it achieves the same goal without public intervention.
Thus, banks should receive a greater proportion of the bond if deportation is
accomplished at a lower cost without the intervention of the authorities.
A. Interviews with Jamaican Guest Workers and Lenders
The author conducted qualitative field work as a supplement to the
theoretical arguments in order to aid in assessment of the importance and
practical feasibility of the proposal. These consisted of focus groups with
Jamaican subsistence farmers who have traveled to North America as
agricultural guest workers. 67 The findings are summarized as follows.
Although interviewees discussed a range of options, the bottom line
was that the subjects currently have few options to finance big-ticket items,
such as visa expenses. When they do finance such expenses, they are likely
to rely on family or informal financial intermediaries. There was a notable
67

In other areas of legal scholarship, ethnographic research or qualitative field
work has shed light on interdisciplinary analyses of compliance, both in contract law
and in the criminal law. For an article that is a paradigmatic example of qualitative
field work in the area of contract law and secured transactions, see Ronald Mann,
Secured Credit and Software Financing, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 134, 151-53 (1999)
(conducting a qualitative field study of software companies and their bankers). For
an article that summarizes the influence of ethnographic work on compliance in the
context of criminal law, see Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The
New Path of Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2477 (1997). See also Tracey L. Meares,
Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191 (1998)
(same),Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner
City, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 805, 809–13 (1998) (same).
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bifurcation in their attitudes towards formal financial intermediates. While
they generally had skeptical attitudes to formal financial intermediaries
because of perceived hostile lending practices, they simultaneously believed
that they had a better chance of obtaining loans than their similarly situated
non-migrant peers, because of their healthy revenue streams while working
overseas in the form of remittances.
The author then conducted interviews with formal financial
intermediaries to assess whether their experience of providing financial
services to poor rural Jamaicans coincided with the views of the focus group
participants. Most financial intermediaries conceded that they usually
insisted on collateral for loans, a practice which excluded most prospective
migrant clients. While the banks rarely expected to recoup value in the event
of a loan default, the primary rationale offered for an insistence on collateral
was that it allowed them to issue strategic threats to potential defaulters.
However, the banking interviewees had significant concerns regarding
enforcement of loan terms. Bankers believed that it would be difficult to
secure re-possession of collateral by state actors, even if they received
favorable judgments in Jamaican courts.
The proposed institutional innovations of visa-as-collateral discussed
in the ensuing section (IV) are influenced by the interview findings.
B. Methodology
The study was not meant to be a detailed study of financial
intermediation, for which the “gold standard” of economic ethnographic
work is a review of diaries in which subjects keep precise records of their
financial transactions. 68 The research design was entirely qualitative and the
study methodology was multi-method in focus. 69 This is a difficult-to-reach
population and partly for this reason, the study was not randomized. Utilizing
referrals from previous work in this population, I developed a snowball
sample, a method which is often used in qualitative field work for subjects
with similar characteristics. The typical subject was a resident of a rural
Jamaican community, who had previously been a guest worker visa and
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See, e.g., RUTHERFORD, supra note 53; See also COLLINS, supra note 24.
I acknowledge the work of Mr. Densil Reid, who has significant experience
in fieldwork in rural agricultural populations.
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expressed an interest in working in North America again. 70 All interviews
and interview notes are on file with the author. 71
C. Summary of Focus Group Findings
The author explained the bonding proposal to the focus-group
participants. Although the author did not provide an estimate of the average
value of a deterrent bond, focus group participants understood that it would
be significant since the average Jamaican agricultural worker quadruples his
family’s earnings as a guest worker in North America. 72
Most respondents described themselves as being “well-off” in
relation to their similarly situated non-migrant neighbors, due largely to their
overseas earnings. Most emphasized that prior to their initial receipt of a
70

Although tourism workers are now eligible to access the U.S. as guest
workers, in the Jamaican context, these persons are not understood to be low-skilled
since they have received some formal training in trade schools, and complete tests to
gain certifications. As such, I restricted the sample to persons who are understood in
the Jamaican context to be “low-skilled,” namely agricultural workers. Their access
to overseas labor markets is the most restricted, since they are considered high risks
for immigration infractions. They typically lack formal training, are low-income and
are poorly situated to provide the evidence of formal ties in Jamaica (including hard
assets such as land) that are typically required to demonstrate their suitability for
visas. For a description of the snowball sampling technique as it has been applied in
studies of low-skilled migrants, see Wayne Cornelius, Interviewing Undocumented
Immigrants: Methodological Reflections Based on Fieldwork in Mexico and the
United States, 16 INT’L MIGRATION REV., 378-411 (1982).
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In keeping with practice in such studies to maintain the privacy of
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initials. They include DR1, MK, DR2, AB, WM, LM, FC, CL, BR, EC, JH, DD,
DO, MS, DM, LM, DD and DP.
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This estimate is based on a survey of funds remitted by guest workers
conducted by the Remittance Research Group in the Department of Economics at the
University of the West Indies. Notably, it was not possible based on the available
research to segregate the earnings of American guest workers (as opposed to
Canadian guest workers). See also Survey of Living Conditions, published by Sir
Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies, University of the West
Indies and the Planning Institute of Jamaica. The most recent online data set is for
2007. http://salises.mona.uwi.edu/databank/slc2007/survey0/index.html Jamaicans
who are able to travel to the United States to work experience a substantial “place
premium,” namely the wage gain accruing to foreign workers who arrive in the U.S.
The average 35 year old Jamaican in the U.S. with 9 years of education earns 3.63
times what he would earn in Jamaica. See Clemens et al, supra note 19.
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guest worker visa, they had found it difficult to raise funds for migration
related-costs, such as passport and visa fees. Given the difficulty in raising
funds for these relatively modest costs, interview subjects felt sure that the
cost of a bond would be prohibitive for those who did not have access to a
loan.
Focus group participants also indicated that they might have access to
financing through other sources; notably, these sources were all informal.
The predominant mechanism of financial intermediation appeared to be
informal savings clubs or “partners,” the indigenous parlance for Rotating
Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs), 73 organized by church groups,
community clubs and farming associations. 74 Respondents’ attitudes towards
formal financial institutions demonstrated an interesting bifurcation. They
seemed aware of one lending program offered by a prominent local financial
institution, which was specifically targeted at migrants who were regular
remitters (that is, migrants who sent funds regularly back to Jamaica while
working overseas). 75 However, although they were aware of this program in
the abstract, they appeared overwhelmingly skeptical that they would be able
to borrow from any formal financial institutions. Even though only one
respondent had ever approached a formal financial institution for a loan, they
repeatedly stated that the institutions’ lending policies were not conducive to
rural farmers since most did not have collateral other than their farms which
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Timothy Besley et al., The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit
Associations, in READINGS IN THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (DILIP
MOOKHERJEE & DEBRAJ RAY eds., 2001) at 792-93, describe ROSCAS as follows:
“members commit to putting a fixed sum of money into a "pot" for each period of
the life of the ROSCA. Lots are drawn, and the pot is randomly allocated to one of
the members. In the next period, the process repeats itself, except that the previous
winner is excluded from the draw for the pot. The process continues, with every past
winner excluded, until each member of the ROSCA has received the pot once. At
this point, the ROSCA is either disbanded or begins over again.”
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Indeed, respondents appeared to be involved in other risk-pooling
arrangements, such as informal agricultural insurance arrangements. For example,
farmer A commits to sharing his crop with farmer B if a catastrophic event such as a
fire occurs and vice versa. For a good summary of some of the research in this area,
see Abigail Barr, Marleen Dekker & Marcel Fafchamps, Risk Sharing Relations and
Enforcement Mechanisms (Ctr. for the Study of African Economies, Working Paper
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many seemed unwilling to put at risk. 76 Nevertheless, they expressed the
view that, theoretically, they should be in a better position than their peers to
access loan financing given that they already had superior access to informal
financial intermediation (in the form of ROSCAs) and they were known in
their communities for their overseas earnings. 77
D. How Migrants Currently Finance their Relocation Costs
The economic ethnography literature demonstrates that virtually all
financial intermediation services currently utilized by the poor exist in the
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Indeed, Field et al. and Galiani et al. have found a similar unwillingness to
put homes at risk to access loans among the urban poor in several Latin American
cities. Sebastian Galiani and Ernesto Schargrodsky, Property Rights for the Poor:
Effects of Land Titling, Centro de Investigacion en Finanzas at 26 (Working Paper,
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The difficulty that farmers experience in accessing credit in developing
countries is supported by other research. Indeed, this appears to be a primary
motivator for migration. In the 1990s, there was a sudden surge of Pakistani farmers
traveling overseas as guest workers. Economists found that lack of access to credit
was the major factor accounting for the upsurge. Pakistani farmers seeking to take
advantage of the Green Revolution found themselves unable to buy expensive
fertilizers. A primary rationale for migration was either to generate funds for their
own farms or to generate excess cash to make loans to other farmers. Thus,
migration emerged as an innovative credit mechanism to deal “a vacuum in . . . rural
credit facilities.” Interestingly, the rate of migration was highest among members of
the land-owning castes that had title to their land, but were generally unable to
access credit at home. Having migrated, they were then better able to access credit
than their non-migrant peers. Alain Lefebvre “International Labor Migration from
Two Pakistani Villages with Different Forms of Agriculture,” Pakistan Development
Review, 29: 1-20 (1990) in MASSEY ET AL (EDS.), WORLDS IN MOTION:
UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AT THE END OF THE MILLENNIUM
(2005). A similar study of migration patterns of Egyptian guest workers who had
previously been farmers found similar results. The primary rationale for migration
appeared the inability to access credit at home to upgrade their farms. Richard H.
Adams, Worker Remittances and Inequality in Rural Egypt, 38 ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 45-71 (1989).
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THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (Oct. 2008) at 35.
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informal economy 78 and the same is true for poor migrants. Typically poor
migrants are unable to obtain visas and must locate a “coyote,” namely, an
underground broker 79 who is willing to transport them through clandestine
cross-border networks and then seek financing for coyote fees. 80 Coyote fees
are typically prohibitive for the average migrant. 81 Migrants who already
have social networks in the United States can take low-interest loans from
their friends or family or from informal savings clubs, which are generally
sustained by remittances from relatives overseas; this appears to be a popular
method of financing. 82 If these sources are unavailable, migrants typically
seek to obtain financing from a local money-lender, where interest rates
appear to be extremely high (studies estimate these on an annualized basis as
ranging from 50% to 120% depending on the particulars of the local
market). 83
Migrants also have another option: they may obtain financing from a
coyote. The implicit interest rates charged by coyotes appear to be
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exorbitant, exceeding even the very high rates of local money-lenders. 84
The willingness of coyotes to extend credit appears to depend on a number of
factors beyond the perceived default-risk of the client, including the coyote’s
capability to enforce informal “loan contracts” if a borrower defaults, their
historical tenure in the coyote business and their overhead costs. 85 There is
evidence that even under conditions where border passage is not clandestine,
these conditions may still persist. For example, although migration from
South Asia to the Gulf is almost entirely documented (i.e. migrants have
valid visas), money lenders and labor brokers appear to enforce loan
contracts for migration expenses with explicit and implicit threats of
violence.
E. The Background Legal Context
For my friends, anything; for my enemies, the law.
Oscar R. Benavides, Former President of Peru 86
Lenders confirmed the views of migrant respondents that there are
few formal financial services available to them. Notably, these lenders
typically insisted on collateral. Among those that engage in non-collateral
based (i.e. unsecured) lending, most engage in micro-lending.
Lenders cited as a primary factor in firms’ reluctance to lend to the
poor was the pervasive uncertainty regarding the likelihood of enforcement
of loan contracts, and repossession of collateral. Specifically, the
interviewees’ concerns centered on six different possibilities:
1) Firms were concerned that the de jure policy surrounding loan
contracts may change;
2) Firms were concerned that the de jure rules surrounding the
repossession of collateral may change;
84
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Interview with Spener. Notably, the coyote’s capability to enforce loan
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3) Even if the de jure rules surrounding loan contracts did not
change, there could be a gap between de jure rules and judicial
application of these rules to the facts of their case;
4) Even if the de jure rules surrounding repossession of collateral
did not change, there could be a gap between de jure rules and
judicial application of these rules to the facts of their case;
5) Even if the courts ruled in their favor with respect to loan
contracts, there could be a gap between the courts’ judgments
and the de facto implementation of these judgments by state
actors; and,
6) Even if the courts ruled in their favor with respect to
repossession of collateral, there could be a gap between courts’
judgments and the de facto implementation of these judgments
by state actors.
The last two factors were of particular concern. Lenders expressed more
confidence in the legal rules and the judiciary responsible for their
administration than they did in the likelihood that state actors would enforce
favorable rulings. Notably, the interviewees articulated two independent
stains of concerns regarding institutional quality. First, there is a concern
regarding the institutional quality of the judicial branch (i.e. the judicial
application of rules to the facts of a particular case) not because of perceived
corruption but because the judicial branch is poorly resourced, resulting in
long delays in rulings. Second there is a concern regarding the institutional
quality of the state actors responsible for implementing the courts’ judgments
into credible enforcement actions. This finding demonstrates that weak
judicial systems undermine the likelihood that financial intermediaries will
rely on a de jure rule being translated into a judicial decision, and in turn,
weak state actors undermine the likelihood that financial intermediaries will
rely on de facto implementation of judicial decisions. Given this legal
context, in the event that bankers do lend, such lending is unlikely to be
subject to broad-based and equally applied rules. On the contrary, lending is
more likely to be based on deals, namely, highly specific accommodations
for individual borrowers or groups of borrowers.
F.

The Four Principles Underlying the Extension of Credit to the Poor

Against a background of pervasive informality and legal uncertainty,
Jamaican banks offered rationales for their lending practices that seem
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somewhat unconventional in light of traditional theories of lending in the
legal scholarship. Four principles appear to undergird lending to the poor.
First, banks may forego collateral-based lending altogether if they have a
relationship with or share a community with the borrower and thus have
ample information about him or her. Second, when they forego collateralbased lending, they structure contracts that enable them to extract a penalty
from the borrower even if they are unable to recoup their funds. Third, such
penalties are often extracted in a manner that minimizes the need for
enforcement by a poorly developed, unreliable and inaccessible legal system.
Finally, in a context of pervasive legal uncertainty, collateral is still valuable,
and where it is available, banks may accept collateral not primarily for its
liquidation value, but rather for the ability that it provides banks to
strategically threaten the borrower with seizure in order to motivate her
repayment.
1. The Difficulties Surrounding Collateral May Lead Banks to Forego
Collateral or Enforcement of Their Repossession Rights
Even if poor households have available collateral, banks may still be
wary of accepting such collateral, and even if they accept it, they may
forego enforcement of their repossession rights in the event of a default. 87
This finding is surprising, particularly against the background of a plethora
of scholarship in both law and economics arguing that one strategy to
mitigate credit rationing is to enable asset-building so that the poor are able
to offer collateral. 88 Yet, the empirical evidence regarding this particular
87

This finding is also supported by Galiani et al, supra note 76; Field et al,
supra note 76.
88
Hernando De Soto’s work advocacy of titling programs among the third
world poor is the most well-known example of this approach. HERNANDO DE SOTO,
THE OTHER PATH: THE ECONOMIC ANSWER TO TERRORISM (1989); HERNANDO DE
SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITALISM: WHY CAPITALISM TRUMPS IN THE WEST, AND
FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000). See also, Introduction to ROBERT COOTER AND
HANS-BERND SCHAEFER, LAW AND POVERTY OF NATIONS, (Jan. 10, 2010)
(unpublished
book
manuscript,
on
file
at
http://works.bepress.com/robert_cooter/144); Michael J. Trebilcock & Paul-Erik
Veel, Property Rights and Development: The Contingent Case for Formalization, 30
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 397 (2008); Paul G. Mahoney The Common Law and Economic
Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2001); Richard A. Posner,
Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, The World Bank Research
Observer, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1998), but see Introduction to MARK GOODALE AND
SALLY E. MERRY, THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE
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claim is decidedly mixed and suggests that the skepticism of collateralbased lending that I found among Jamaican banks may be widespread in the
developing world. 89
My interviews in Jamaica suggested that the
fundamental challenge is as follows: just as important as recognizing an
owner’s possession (and the repossession rights of a secured creditor in the
event of a default) is the existence of a reliable legal system to which a bank
can turn to enforce a loan contract and its repossession rights. 90
2. Bank Structure Contracts That Enable Them to Extract a Penalty From
the Borrower, Without Resorting to the Formal Legal System
When these bankers typically lend to the migrant poor, they are most
likely to pursue micro-credit programs. Micro-credit often has been
described as the only advance in lending that has succeeded in expanding the
availability of credit for the very poor on a macro-level. The primary
innovation of micro-credit programs is group-lending: individuals without
access to collateral form groups with the goal of obtaining a loan. While
loans are made individually to members of the group, all of the members of
the group will be denied access to future borrowing if any individual
borrower fails to repay. 91 It is this innovation that appears to account for the
consistently high repayment rates.
In accordance with the literature, some banker-interviewees stressed
the existence of social collateral as a substitute for physical collateral, since
those who are at risk of defaulting on their loans suffer significant peer
pressure and may even be stigmatized in the larger community in the longterm if they eventually default. However, all of the banker-interviewees
emphasized that in the event of a default they had minimal expectation of
GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL (2007) (expressing doubts about the faith other scholars
have placed in asset building as a strategy for poverty alleviation).
89
Galiani et al., supra note 76; Field et al., supra note 76.
90
I do not mean to single out the importance of legal rules and a reliable legal
system as the most important reason for banks’ reluctance to lend to the titled poor;
there are a variety of other rationales that might be offered for pervasive failures in
credit markets for the poor. For a comprehensive survey of the literature, see Robert
Cull et al., Financial Outreach and Performance: A Global Analysis of Leading
Microbanks 117 Economic Journal 107 (2007).
91
Notably, in most micro-lending programs, there is no formal or legal joint
liability, i.e., group members are not legally obligated to repay the pro rata portion of
a defaulting member. See ARMENDARIZ DE AGHION, et al., THE ECONOMICS OF
MICROFINANCE, Ch. 3 (2005).
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repayment. What appeared attractive to these interviewees about micro-credit
was that peer monitoring provides a penalty that is sure and swift, and that
does not require dependence on a legal system that may be unreliable or
inaccessible.
3. Synergies with Relational Theories of Financing
There is an extensive discussion in the legal scholarship of the
motivations of lenders and borrowers when considering whether to engage in
secured financing. Conventionally, collateral serves the function of reducing
the likelihood that borrowers will default in circumstances where they can
easily divert cash flows without the knowledge of the lender. 92 There is
virtually nothing in the legal scholarship as to how these conventional
theories of secured lending may apply to financing under conditions of
pervasive informality. However, this is a central theme in the development
finance literature, which converges with the legal scholarship on secured
lending in significant respects. 93 While the development finance literature
discusses several potential considerations that might affect institutional
lender behavior in this context, the key issue that is repeatedly emphasized is
the divertibility of cash flows. 94 In conditions of informality, cash diversion
is more likely to occur and more difficult to detect. In response to these
challenges, traditional financial institutions have generally required
collateral. 95
While the traditional view has been that lenders value the right of
liquidation in a secured transaction, this theory is less plausible under these
circumstances. The aforementioned legal challenges present a de facto, if
not de jure, bar to a lender’s ability to liquidate collateral. In this context,
liquidation rights are moot. Yet banks often insist on collateral as a condition
of lending to the poor. The question becomes: Why require collateral from
these borrowers? Of the rationales offered in the literature, those that fall
under the umbrella of indirect “relational” rationales seem most applicable. 96
Relational theories are skeptical of the notion that lenders pursue secured
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Id. at 21.
A good summary is included in Bond and Rai, supra note 30.
94
The Introduction to ARMENDARIZ DE AGHION et al., supra note 91,
provides an excellent summary of this literature.
95
Id.
96
To the extent that these theories focus disproportionately on secured
financing, I mean to emphasize not the security, but rather the relational aspects of
the theories.
93
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transactions because of direct enforcement effects such as liquidation rights.
Rather, these theories emphasize that security has important indirect effects
on the borrower’s behavior and incentives prior to the point of default. 97
Notably, several banker-interviewees emphasized that they value
collateral because of the power that it allows them to wield before the
possibility of default even arises. Specifically, they are able to curtail
excesses of the borrower through strategic threats against the collateral.
Apparently, these threats are credible even if the collateral is only notional
because of the role that threats play in sending signals to the larger
community regarding the health of a debtor’s finances. In this manner,
strategic threat-making falls squarely into a “signaling” theory of secured
lending. 98
It seems particularly applicable in the conditions of informality
which characterize the bottom of the pyramid. Typically, the poor depend
heavily on their communities. This is not coincidental for in resourceconstrained circumstances, neighbors are indispensable to risk pooling
arrangements; the poor are likely to depend on their neighbors for a range of
risk-pooling arrangements from informal agricultural insurance to communal
herding grounds to savings clubs. For obvious reasons, a person’s fate is
heavily intertwined with that of her neighbors. 99 In such close-knit
communities, it is difficult for a borrower to keep private his difficulties with
97

See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured Lending, 80
VA. L. REV. 2179, 2188-89 (1994) (citing the creditor's "power to punish the
debtor"); David Gray Carlson, Secured Lending as a Zero-Sum Game, 19 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1635, 1679-80 (1998) (citing the importance of "[p]ower [as opposed to
monitoring] "); Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business
Lending, 86 GEO. L.J. 1, 11-26 (1997) [hereinafter Mann, Small-Business Secured
Credit] (arguing that for lenders to small businesses, the ability to prevent borrowers
from taking on future debt is a primary motivator for securing the debt); Ronald J.
Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions, 87 GEO. L.J. 2225, 224447 (1999) [hereinafter Mann, Verification Institutions] (same); Alan Schwartz,
Priority Contracts and Priority in Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1396, 1412-14
(1997) (arguing that firms issue secured debt to avert dilution of their claims by later
lenders); Scott, supra note 47, at 927-29 (1986) (suggesting that collateral has
"hostage-like” characteristics); George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions
of Imperfect Information, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 245-47 (1992) (discussing the
bank’s leverage with the lender as an important factor).
98
Triantis, supra note 97. While Triantis does not use the phrase in this
context, it seems particularly applicable.
99
See generally, Barr et al., supra note 74, at 25. (Abigail Barr, et al.)
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his bankers. Rural Jamaican farmers are like the famous Ellicksonian
ranchers; 100 “gossip” appears to play an important role in mediating business
relations. A bank’s threat to enforce a loan agreement provides a signal to
neighbors that the borrower is experiencing financial difficulty. 101
G.

Visas as New “New Property” 102

Visa-as-collateral has been designed with the foregoing emphasis on
unconventional enforcement mechanisms in mind. The important conceptual
shift is a re-conceptualization of a visa as a license, a quasi-property right
with collateral-like characteristics. Why conceptualize a visa in this manner?
1. The Reich Analogy and a Visa as a Franchise or a License
In a seminal article forty years ago, Reich noted that an increasing
number of persons derived their wealth from their relationships with the
federal government. He identified a range of benefits which derived from
government largesse and famously named them “the new property. 103
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ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991).
101
As Scott has so aptly put it, “in essence, relational security signals (to)
other creditors that a policeman is walking the beat, and thus they can relax their
vigilance in taking individual precautions.” Scott, supra note 49, at 14.
102
The term is Blocher’s play on Reich’s term. See Blocher, supra note 35.
103
Like Reich, I utilize the term “property” not in the traditional Blackstonian
sense that generations of lawyers now associate with alienablity and “despotic”
ownership, inter alia, but rather, as the word “property” is utilized in a modern sense
to refer to a more abstract and complicated network of legal entitlements and
obligations which serve not only narrow private goals, but also promote larger public
goals. The proposal is not that the visa would constitute actual collateral, but rather
that the visa would serve similar purposes for a secured lender that have traditionally
been served by secured credit. However, there are clearly significant differences
between a visa as a collateral-like device and traditional secured credit. I briefly
mention a few obvious differences. First, even if the federal government were to
create property rights in visas, visas are not typically assignable. (For a discussion
of how this might theoretically be done, the software model is useful, see, Ronald
Mann Secured Credit and Software Financing, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 134, 151-53
(1999).) Thus, they would hardly constitute general intangibles in UCC terms. (See
American Law Institute 2005 discussion of U.C.C. § 9-106) Second, even if there
were an assignable property right in a federally issued visa (as a license), there
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Specifically, Reich noted that public law entitlements were
increasingly fulfilling goals that had traditionally been associated with
private law and a market economy, for example, providing millions of
Americans with their primary source of income. Visas, in fact, share several
“new property” characteristics. For example, like welfare benefits although
visas were initially conceived as easily revocable privileges, they have since
evolved into instruments with property-like characteristics, which in many
instances are only revocable if the visa-recipient is provided with some due
process. Like other forms of “new property,” visas provide for their holders
a certain legal status bestowed by government, through which they can
access a particular set of economic benefits. While it is true that visas do not
share traditional characteristics of property as it conventionally has been
understood (for example, visas typically may not be bought or sold and are
generally understood to be categorically excluded from the market), in this
manner, visas are no different from other forms of “new property” such as
government-backed entitlements (e.g., welfare benefits) that are inalienable
but nevertheless widely recognized to have property-like characteristics.
Consider further a visa’s analogy to a franchise or a license, both
prototypical examples of “new property.” Although a visa would not
typically be thought of as either a franchise or a license, in fact, a visa is
deeply analogous to both. Indeed, U.S. visas may be described as licenses to
would undoubtedly be concerns regarding debt servitude. See, e.g., Elizabeth
Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Information, 82 Cornell L. Rev 1373, 138687 (1997) (noting that there are ethical lines which limit security such as the
prohibition on servitude). For a general discussion of the prohibition of debt
servitude see, see Lynn M. LoPucki & Elizabeth Warren, Secured Credit: A Systems
Approach 759-72 (2009). For a more detailed discussion of the evolution of the
prohibition on debt servitude, see Peter J. Coleman, Debtors and Creditors in
America: Insolvency, Imprisonment for Debt, and Bankruptcy, 1607-1900, at 41, 77,
138, 147 n.11, 164-65, 218-19 (1974). Third, there would be no actual foreclosure
rights. The notion of tying loan-compliance to visa-compliance (and vice versa)
brings to mind cross-default provisions that are common in private loan contracts.
While bankers typically insist in loan contracts that borrowers meet their regulatory
obligations as a condition of the loan, a default in the other direction (i.e., regulators
insisting that borrowers mean their loan obligations) is unusual, and unsurprisingly, I
have not been able to find a discussion of such practices (or even proposals) in the
literature.
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work in the United States. Like licenses, visas make it possible for their
recipients to engage in particular kinds of work. Like other forms of
licensees, visa-holders are only able to receive what is usually their primary
source of income because they hold visas. Thus, the “new property” analogy
fits.
Further, like franchises, particular types of visas may be
conceptualized as partial monopolies. Indeed, some economists have pointed
out that visas bear strong analogies to partial monopolies in other arenas. 104
In part by limiting their number, the government has made U.S. visas
extremely remunerative for the lucky few who receive them. 105 It is difficult
to dispute that visas create huge financial windfalls for recipients. 106
2.

A Visa’s Other Property-Like Characteristics: Reputation

Visas display another property-like characteristic as well. Recent
scholarship has contended that “reputation itself – social status and the
respect of others – can usefully be understood as a form of property.” 107
Sociological studies demonstrate that visas confer reputational benefits on
visa recipients that they are able to monetize in myriad ways while they are
in the United States. 108 Moreover, these reputational benefits extend to their
104

Indeed the partial monopoly argument has been used to buttress the
distributive justice concern, namely the view that requiring visas to work makes it
costlier for poor people to fill jobs which they desperately needed and which have
few natural barriers to entry.
105
This is particularly the case with respect to highly-skilled visas, which are
usually limited in number and whose holders usually command substantial
compensation in the marketplace. See Gates Tells Congress What is Needed for
Better Work Force, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 2008 (discussing testimony of Bill Gates
on highly skilled visas).
106
The franchise-like characteristics are clearly more applicable to particular
categories of visas. For example, if visa-recipients are competing with a large pool
of undocumented persons once they arrive in the United States, the franchise-like
characteristics of the visa are clearly less applicable.
107
See generally Blocher, supra note 35. The term “reputational property”
generally has been utilized with respect to intellectual property such as goodwill.
However, unlike reputational property without clear economic value (such as
reputational property in the virtual world of social networking sites), the reputational
benefits conferred by visas are monetized in concrete ways.
108
Sociological studies demonstrate that because visa recipients from certain
communities have historically done well in the United States, they have built
reputational capital from which future visa recipients also benefit. For example,
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families in their countries and communities of origin, where they also are
monetized.
Reputations, and the corresponding ability to monetize them, may be
augmented or diminished depending on whether aliens maintain their visas
and remain providers for their families and communities of origin. While
there is little doubt that simply by virtue of the countries and communities
from which they originate 109 migrants remain subject to extreme credit
rationing, 110 the interviews of Jamaican migrant workers and professional
lenders support other studies indicating that visas confer reputational benefits

Cuban migrants generally are understood in the Miami business community to be
good credit risks. Even when they lack start-up capital, their perceived solid
reputations have allowed them to enter certain forms of business in the U.S. for
which there typically have been high barriers to entry for native-born Americans.
See Alejandro Portes, The Social Origins of the Cuban Enclave Economy of Miami,
30 SOCIO. PERSP. 340, 363 (1987); Robert W. Fairlie and Bruce D. Meyer, Ethnic
and Racial Self-Employment Differences and Possible Explanations, 31 J. OF HUM.
RESOURCES 757-93 (1996); Alejandro Portes and Leif Jensen, The Enclave and the
Entrants: Patterns of Ethnic Enterprise in Miami Before and After Mariel, 54 AM.
SOCIO. REV. 929-49 (1989).
109
As economists have sought to explain why firms in developing countries do
not always avail themselves of the best opportunities that are available, a primary
contributing factor appears to be credit constraints. For a good summary of this
literature, see Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, Reputation Effects and the Limits
of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry, 115 Q. J. OF ECO. 989
(2000); Oded Galor and Joseph Zeira, Income Distribution and Macroeconomics,
60 REV. OF ECO. STUD. 35 (1993).
110
This evidence comes from Bolivia, Mexico and the Commonwealth
Caribbean. For a brief background summary of the literature on credit-rationing
among the poor in developing countries, see Niloy Bose & Richard Cothren,
Asymmetric Information and Loan Contracts in a Neoclassical Growth Model, 29 J.
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 423, 429-30 (1997) (observing that investors,
particularly in developing countries, face the prospect of credit-rationing, and a
favored group of firms typically enjoys access to the credit market at very low cost,
while others must rely exclusively on internally generated funds.) A good summary
is included in the Introduction to the 1989 World Bank Annual report. World Bank,
Financial Systems and Development (1989). Two other works that provide excellent
summaries are BASU KAUSHIK, THE LESS DEVELOPED ECONOMY: A CRITIQUE OF
CONTEMPORARY THEORY (1984); James R. Tybout, Credit Rationing and Investment
Behavior in a Developing Country, 65 Review of Economics and Statistics, 598-607
(1983).
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that allow some recipients to obtain credit that normally would not be
available to them. 111
To the extent that poor migrants are more likely to receive credit
than their similarly situated neighbors without visas, the interviews indicate a
continuum of rationales that might be offered for this result. Notable among
these rationales is that bank lending is derivative of the reputational benefits
associated with visas. Banks appear more willing to extend credit if some
external entity has vetted the prospective borrower. A U.S. visa would
constitute a signal that a reliable authority has vetted its recipient. In this
manner, a visa may fulfill the role of more conventional due diligence, 112
such as credit reports, which are typically unavailable in developing
countries. Moreover, migrant-borrowers already are likely to be high-status
persons within their communities who would suffer some reputational loss in
the event of a default. 113
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The discussion in footnote supra, note 76, concerning improved credit
access for Pakistani and Egyptian migrant farmers supports this conclusion.
112
Indeed, one scholar argues that by effectively constraining
defaults, the credit reporting system actually has created collateral.
See Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Human Worth As Collateral, 38 RUTGERS
L. J. 793 (2007).
113
My interviews with loan officers in the formal Jamaican banking sector
who service the poor supported these views. I identified a few banks which extend
credit to migrants to fund costs associated with the regularization or extension of
their immigration status in the United States. For example, two leading financial
institutions in the Caribbean and Central America have large-scale programs to
extend loans to migrants for the application and legal costs associated with extending
their “Temporary Protected Status.” (TPS) These financial institutions are Jamaica
National Building Society (“JN”), which services Caribbean nationals and Banco
Pichincha, which services Central American nationals and particularly Ecuadorians.
The Secretary of Homeland Security may designate the nationals of a foreign
country for TPS due to conditions in the country that temporarily prevent the
country's nationals from returning safely. Following the recent earthquake,
undocumented
Haitian
nationals
received
TPS.
See
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d
1a/?vgnextoid=848f7f2ef0745210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel
=848f7f2ef0745210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD (last visited June 10, 2010)
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Part III. INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN BENEFITS
A. Is This Proposal Politically Plausible?
An observer reasonably might question the political plausibility of visaas-collateral on the grounds that the U.S. government would essentially be
conditioning visa renewal not on a breach of U.S. law -- or even a breach of
foreign law -- but on compliance with private loan contracts in a foreign
jurisdiction to which the U.S. is not a party. 114 This skepticism is reasonable
since in matters of immigration, distributive justice concerns historically
have not been a major concern for Congress. 115 Rather, when making
immigration law, Congress traditionally has been motivated by labor needs
and economic concerns, and more recently, it appears to be motivated
increasingly by public discomfort with the national security implications of
the presence of a large number of unauthorized persons in the United
States. 116 Thus, the question becomes: does this proposal offer other
institutional design benefits, which would make it attractive to Congress?
The purpose of this section is to highlight such benefits.
In conditions of informational asymmetry, governments often seek to
identify private parties who have better access to information, to aid in their
gate-keeping and enforcement functions. 117 Given the weak institutional
114

It bears emphasizing that the issue is not one of legal permissibility; indeed,
the INA includes a dizzying array of bases for excluding aliens from the U.S., which
have been routinely upheld by the courts even when they bear no clear relation to
immigration policy goals. See LEGOMSKY AND RODRIGUEZ, supra note 14 at 514520, 544- 589.
115
Introduction to ZOLBERG, supra note 16.
116
Id. Indeed, a recent report by the Pew Research Center for the People & the
Press confirms that a majority of Americans want tougher enforcement of
immigration laws and a tough road to citizenship for those undocumented
immigrants already in the country. See Scott Keeter, Where the Public Stands on
Immigration Reform, Pew Research Center (Nov. 23, 2009) available at
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1421/where-the-public-stands-on-immigration-reform.
117
See, e.g., Manns, supra note 15, at 889 (The desirability of private
gatekeepers turns on the fact that the goods or services they supply or demand
provide them with cost-effective opportunities to detect and potentially prevent
wrongdoing by customers or suppliers. For example, lawyers and accountants may
be well-positioned to detect fraud by their clients . . . at significantly lower
economic and social costs than public enforcers. Enlisting these types of private
actors as public monitors of narrowly defined areas of wrongdoing may provide
governments with cost-effective ways to outsource enforcement functions . . . ).
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framework and pervasive informality in many developing countries, the
challenges of enlisting uncoordinated private actors as gate-keepers and
enforcers may seem especially daunting. However, there are several features
of financial intermediaries that make them appropriate candidates.

1. The Key Features of Financial Intermediaries to the Poor
Financial intermediaries know their clients well and play critical roles in
their daily lives. 118 Indeed, a detailed ethnographic study of the spending
habits of the poor in Bangladesh, India, and South Africa found that a
majority of respondents interacted with informal financial intermediaries
very regularly. Researchers find a dizzying range of financial intermediaries
servicing the poor including deposit takers, money-lenders, savings clubs,
and rotating savings and credit associations. In the absence of reliable
financial record-keeping, informal financial intermediaries in developing
countries must visit their clients on a nearly daily basis to ascertain their
assets and liabilities. Indeed, they know their clients so well that they give
new meaning to the term “community banker.”
By leveraging their extensive access to on-the ground information,
informal money-lenders appear to have developed an expertise in pricing risk
in conditions of informality. Moreover, they appear to be well-hedged
against down-side risk: through their extensive networks, they are able to
locate defaulters and collect outstanding amounts. Indeed, they are
paradigmatic hostage takers: even if borrowers disappear, money-lenders
have access to relatives, against whom they may make implicit and explicit
threats.
As formal financial intermediaries have recognized the size of the
potential client base at the bottom of the pyramid, they too are increasingly
stepping into the lending market for the poor. 119 Moreover, they appear to be
118

DARYL COLLINS et Al., PORTFOLIOS OF THE POOR: HOW THE WORLD’S
POOR LIVE ON $2 A DAY (2009).
119
Providing financial intermediation in the formal lending sector will
potentially have spillover effects. Moneylenders may provide credit, but they rarely
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replicating the strategies of their informal competitors. For example, rather
than setting up formal branches, they too provide home-based banking.
Moreover, recognizing the expertise of informal lenders in pricing local
risks, when formal financial institutions seek to increase their market share,
they often hire persons who were previously providers of informal financial
services. These persons typically are from local communities and have preexisting knowledge of potential clients.
Finally, as developing countries have modified their regulatory
frameworks to create incentives for formal financial intermediaries to service
the poor, in many countries, the market at the bottom of the pyramid is
becoming increasingly competitive. 120 As barriers to entry fall and
competition for making loans increases, lenders’ business reputations matter
for recruiting potential clients. The preliminary evidence is that interest rates
have fallen, customer service has improved, and unscrupulous practices have
declined. 121
2. Financial Intermediaries as Gate-keepers and Policing the Gatekeepers
The foregoing speaks to several key features of financial intermediaries
that make them appropriate gatekeepers. 122 Recall that the information
offer a gateway to other asset-building services, such as insurance, annuities, and so
forth. As one banker pointed out in his interview, informal money-lenders are not in
a position to execute contracts with re-insurers! Indeed, studies of the clients of the
most famous micro-credit institution, the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, have
confirmed that once the poor begin to access credit, they simultaneously gain access
to health, agricultural and funeral insurance, and retirement accounts, among other
services that have heretofore been unattainable. Introduction to DE AGHION, supra
note 91.
120
We have seen more significant forays into extending formal financial
services to the poor in markets where the bottom of the pyramid is so large that the
size of the market serves to mitigate the misgivings of financial institutions about
servicing this segment of the population. These include markets such as India and
Brazil (as opposed to much smaller markets such as Jamaica). Introduction to C.K.
PRAHALAD, supra note 32.
121
JAMES R. BARTH et al., RETHINKING BANK REGULATION: TILL ANGELS
GOVERN (2005).
122
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The
Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 308-09 (2004)
(defining gatekeepers as "reputational intermediary(ies)"); Assaf Hamdani,
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needed to assess trustworthiness of a potential migrant is hyper-local; it is
difficult to access or evaluate ex-ante predictors of reliability on a non-local
level. Notably, screening and monitoring already are core competencies of
lenders; they must perform this service well to stay in business. In the
conditions of informality that are pervasive in the countries from which poor
migrants typically originate, banks who now service the poor are only able to
stay in business if they force the convergence of the formal and the informal.
They typically draw on a range of informal networks on the ground to
closely scrutinize potential clients. These are precisely the hyper-local
networks that the U.S. typically has not been able to penetrate to gather
information on visa applicants. Thus, these banks constitute ideal
“gatekeepers.”
Second, formal lenders are providing indispensable (or nearindispensable) services. They play a critical income-smoothing function,
allowing the poor to transform irregular income streams into smoother
resource flows.
As formal financial intermediation becomes more standard in poor
communities, bankers will become less difficult to replace, particularly if
they crowd out their informal competitors through good service and
competitive pricing. Third, as formal players, reputational integrity should
be important to their businesses. Theoretically, if they operate within a
regulatory structure, they receive minimal (or negative) payoff for breaking
the law. In this sense, they are essentially reputational intermediaries.
If the banks become the gatekeepers, who will police the gatekeepers?
The potential “rent-seeking” problems are apparent in that without external
oversight, loan officers will have powerful incentives to choose from among
a group of qualified applicants those who are willing to offer bribes. A loan
officer still may be able to keep the loan default rate of her clients low, thus
assuring that she will retain her position and earn some extra income in the
Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53, 63 (2003) (defining gatekeepers as
parties who "offer a service . . . that is necessary . . . to . . . engage in certain
activities"); Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye, Scholer: Enlisting Lawyers to
Improve the Regulation of Financial Institutions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1050-54
(1993) (noting that gatekeepers often provide “indispensable” services); Reinier H.
Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 53, 53 (1986) (noting that gatekeepers "are able to disrupt misconduct by
withholding their cooperation").
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process. So, she might figure, why not take a bribe? Indeed, there is
evidence of extensive rent-seeking among loan programs for the rural poor in
developing countries, particularly when the loans are backed by governmentguarantees. 123 Thus, the foregoing proposal is contingent on the existence of
a robust regulatory system in which banks are overseen by some external
entity, a situation that does not currently pertain in many developing
countries from which guest workers typically originate. 124
For obvious reasons, it is difficult for the U.S. to influence rule-making
and enforcement on the ground in a developing country. There is a larger
potential benefit that perhaps dwarfs the others from a developmental
perspective. The United States may seek to instigate a “race to the top,”
encouraging the institutionalization of regulatory best practices in developing
countries, by insisting that it will only accept bonds underwritten by lenders
who operate in countries that meet certain standards of regulation.
The U.S. should also insist that banks achieve certain levels of
effectiveness in their screening processes. Consider the following: If a guest
worker overstays but continues to service the loan, then what incentive does
the bank have to get the worker to leave the U.S.? An illegal immigrant
might just pay off the loan, essentially to “buy off” the bank. In the worst
case scenario, one might envision certain banks whose clients have such high
rates of visa-overstay that the banks essentially become facilitators of
undocumented migration. To avoid this problem, the U.S. government must
penalize banks that lend to too many visa violators by refusing to accept their
bonds. 125
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Richard L. Meyer & Geetha Nagarajan, Rural Finance: Recent Advances
and Emerging, Lessons, Debates, and Opportunities 76 (Department of Agricultural,
Environmental, and Development Economics, Working Paper No. AEDE-WP-004105, 2005).
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Banking and the State, The World Bank: Crisis Talk: Emerging Markets
and
the
Financial
Crisis,
http://www.typepad.com/services/trackback/6a00d834515e9269e2010536e7386497
0b (last visited Jan. 18, 2010). Some economists have argued that regulating
financial disclosure requirements is the most effective contributor to banking
development and protecting poor savers and borrowers in particular. See BARTH ET
AL, supra note 156.
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Of course it takes “two to tango” and the U.S. should also tweak its own
policies to discourage visa overstay, even as it attempts to influence bank policies.
For example, this proposal will work best if those who abide by the terms of their
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The bottom line: in a context in which banks cannot count on rules, they
make deals with individual borrowers. 126 By borrowing against a U.S. visa,
migrants will be in essence signing unto a U.S.-influenced “loan default
equals visa default” rule in the local market. If borrowers service their loans
within this rule-bound framework, banks will have positive institutional
experience with poor borrowers, allowing them to create actuarial tables
calculating risks, and thereby encouraging the growth of a market, in visa-ascollateral lending. Additionally, local regulators will have an incentive to
tighten their rules and banks will abide by the local regulatory framework if
the U.S. insists that these are conditions of local banks participating in the
program. Thus, the visa-as-collateral proposal may help to accelerate a
developing nation’s transition (even interstitially) from an inefficient, dealbased, opaque system of lending to a more efficient, rule-based, transparent
system of lending to the poor. 127
B. The Enforcement Question
1. Migration’s Network Nature and the Difficulty of Enforcement
A central tenet of the economic sociology of immigration is that
migration is sustained by a dense web of interlocking ethnic networks that
operate trans-nationally. Studies have demonstrated that the key factor in
sustaining undocumented migration is the presence of thick cross-border
ethnic networks that facilitate migration, and enable the integration of

visa have some reasonable prospect of visa-renewal once they return to their home
countries. Visa-renewal will essentially become a “reward” for good behavior
(along with the U.S. returning the bond), and provide a further disincentive for guest
workers to disappear into the underground economy. Indeed, several European
Union countries have committed to renewing the visas of low-skilled workers who
return home for precisely this reason. See, Patrick Weil, All or Nothing? What the
United States Can Learn from Europe as it contemplates Circular Migration and
Legalization for Undocumented Immigrants (2010) at
http://database.gmfus.org/rs/ct.aspx?ct=24F76C1FD6E40AEDC1D180ACD22F921
ADCBE5588F8A52DA2349D55444994EE21FC480CCED0D813CA335D773AA9
5658FE9FEA874847170E4EFF895E528EA32B9BC0599DFB0600D5A3404D2763
34C62FA51D8F2756E6638A3D1257F04 (German Marshall Fund, last visited July
10, 2010).
126
Hallward-Dreimer et. al., supra, note 37.
127
Indeed, there is evidence that the Grameen model has had precisely this
effect in Bangladesh. DE AGHION et al., supra note 91.
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migrants even when they lack documentation. 128 Unsurprisingly, these same
transnational networks facilitate the incorporation of persons who previously
have been documented. When persons become undocumented, these
networks provide false documentation and facilitate their placement into
jobs. Thus, migrants are generally incorporated into economic and social
networks with relative ease and minimal costs, irrespective of their legal
status. 129 Notably, all of these networks are quintessentially private. Even
when public officials charged with enforcement have informal ties to these
networks, they generally are unable to penetrate them to enforce immigration
laws. 130 Moreover, even when they are successful in penetrating these
networks and conduct raids in the communities, they generally incur
extraordinary social and economic costs. 131
For example, although polling data shows that a majority of Americans
express concern about ineffective immigration enforcement in the abstract,
when enforcement actually occurs, it is often controversial. Public enforcers
find that they incur the wrath not only of the targets of the raid, but also of a
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PORTES supra note 58, at 22. The landmark work in this regard has been
conducted by Douglas Massey at the Office of Population Research at Princeton
University, who has analyzed Mexican migratory patterns over the last century. See
Michael B. Aguilera & Douglas S. Massey, Social Capital and the Wages of
Mexican Migrants: New Hypotheses and Tests 82 Social Forces 671 (2003).
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range of religious, business and non-governmental actors. 132 In summary,
such immigration raids increase levels of distrust within communities and
undermine “communal efficacy,” as persons who have historically played
critical roles in families and the broader community are displaced. 133
Essentially, a consensus seems to be emerging that forced deportation as a
cure may be worse than the disease. 134 Through encouraging selfdeportation, visa-as-collateral may provide a better alternative.
2. Financial Intermediaries May Be Motivated to Find Non-Compliant
Aliens
This section discusses further institutional innovations that would better
enable banks to extract penalties when aliens default on their bonds and thus,
increase the likelihood that non-compliant aliens will be excluded with
minimal involvement from public enforcers. The key feature of a visabonding system is that the bond will be forfeited if the alien becomes noncompliant with the conditions of the visa. Indeed, in Singapore where
bonding systems are also regularly utilized, once the alien becomes noncompliant, the bond is generally forfeited in its entirety. 135 In contrast to this

132

See Monica Rhor, Impact: Immigration Raids Split Families, Boston Globe
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approach, the proposal herein advocates a system of “staged” or “tiered”
forfeiture.
The first institutional design innovation is that even if an alien is noncompliant with the visa’s conditions, the bank should be able to recoup a
significant proportion of the bond upon providing evidence that the alien in
fact has left the United States. It is critical that the window of opportunity to
recoup the bond should be limited. A network theory of immigration tells us
that undocumented aliens become enmeshed more thoroughly in social
networks if they are out of status for long periods and thus become more
difficult to find, so it is crucial that banks find them quickly. 136
Thus, the second novel feature of this proposal is that the “tiering” of
bond forfeiture should be indexed to the speed with which the bank is able to
provide evidence that the alien has left the U.S. That is, the proportion of the
bond that the bank can recoup could be tied to the speed of self-deportation.
One approach would be to legalize a bail bondsman status for banking
companies. 137 Of course, bail bondsmen are already widely utilized in the
criminal law context; they have significant powers to apprehend individuals
who violate the terms of their bond and flee the authorities. 138 This
approach would undoubtedly be controversial. Indeed, enlisting the support
of the immigration bar in institutionalizing such a bail-bondsman proposal
would be dependent on the successful importation of protections that have
136

PORTES, supra note 56.
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been developed for defendants in the criminal law context into the
immigration context. 139 As applied in the immigration context, bankers (and
their agents) would be given the right to apprehend visa overstayers and turn
them over to the authorities. The key advantage bankers may have is the
ability to engage in superior information gathering. This incentive to
apprehend visa-overstayers would be especially powerful if the government
returned to the bank some percentage of the bond that would otherwise be
forfeited, in the event that the bank can successfully apprehend the visa
overstayer.
3.

Mitigating the risks of “snitching”

Banks will typically be better than the government at accessing
hyper-local information on non-compliant aliens, irrespective of the
mechanism of enforcement. But there is an additional advantage of the
proposed system in that the bank’s enforcement function differs in a critical
way from the classic gatekeeper function. Typically, in the event of
wrongdoing, gatekeepers provide evidence that allows the government to
fulfill the ultimate enforcement function. In so doing, “snitching” is a
quintessential gatekeeper role. However, in this instance, rather than
“snitching,” the gatekeeper may fulfill the ultimate enforcement function by
encouraging the wrong-doers to self-deport.
While snitches (or private informants) are utilized regularly to supplement
public enforcement, snitching may have negative spillover effects,
particularly in poor urban communities where migrants are
disproportionately likely to reside. 140 In the criminal justice context snitching
may augment distrust of law enforcement officials. 141 This is likely to be
true in the immigration context also, since persons are unlikely to distinguish
between immigration enforcement officials and law enforcement more
generally. Moreover, snitching may undermine interpersonal relationships in
communities and generally threaten the social organization of a community,
that is, the web of social relationships that sustain its coherence. 142 Thus, the
139
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ideal scenario would be for gatekeepers to accomplish the enforcement
function without snitching.

PART IV. THE COMMODIFICATION CRITIQUE
A.

Background: Levmore’s puzzle

Consider two migrants who represent opposite loci on the
immigration continuum. “Sanjay,” a Harvard-trained Indian national is a
wealthy Google shareholder. 143 He obtained his visa through a highly
competitive process partly on the basis of a commitment to make a jobgenerating business investment in the U.S. 144 His visa may be revocable if he
does not meet these conditions. 145 A second immigrant, “Ambrosio” is a
Guatemalan construction worker who also makes a financial investment to
gain U.S. labor market access. 146 He pools his family’s meager resources to
make a down-payment to a coyote. 147 Not only does the coyote arrange
Ambrosio’s clandestine cross-border travel, he also serves as an informal
banker, providing a “loan” to fund transportation costs (at least in the form of
deferred payment arrangements). 148
Given a worldwide population of persons with resources who are
willing to pay for access to the United States labor market, the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) embodies the sentiment that it is appropriate to
extract value (either in skills or capital) from those who seek visas. 149 Having
A View from the Bridge, NEW YORKER, Feb. 1, 2010. See also Sampson, Robert J.,
Stephen Raudenbush, and Felton Earls. Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A
Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, SCIENCE 277:918-24 (1997).
143
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incurred significant financial costs, the prospective migrant agrees to abide
by certain rules and incurs the risk of visa revocation if she does not meet her
commitments. The prospective migrant also may face a financial penalty in
the form of costs that she cannot recoup.
Herein lies the bifurcation in treatment that is illustrative of an
uneasy consensus. 150 Migrants are regularly allowed to “put their money
where their mouth is” at the top of the pyramid: Sanjay is a prototype of such
elite access. Contrast this situation with that of Ambrosio, a prototypical
immigrant at the bottom of the pyramid; given the astronomical expenses
Ambrosio incurs to cross the border, 151 it is reasonable to assume that he,
too, would be willing to pay to gain access to a temporary guest worker visa,
the only visa category to which he is likely to have legal access given his low
skill base. However, there is no such option available to him.
Saul Levmore has characterized as a “puzzle” the general
disinclination of political elites when they are already resorting to the market
to allocate visas (as in the case of Sanjay), to simultaneously finance
purchases (for the Ambrosios of the world) to expand demand. 152 Levmore
theorized that terms easily could be reached which could satisfy both the
expansionist instincts of those who support more open borders and the
restrictionist instincts of those who fear the economic, social and cultural
implications of long-term commitments to new migrants.
This article’s advocacy of a visa bonding system coupled with a reconceptualization of a visa-as-collateral may be viewed as one attempt to
map out such terms. By raising the costs of non-compliance and lowering
over-stay rates, bonding systems may expand U.S. labor market access,
particularly for poor migrants. Thus, it addresses the concerns of the
expansionists by making it possible for more persons to enter, albeit
temporarily. It simultaneously addresses the concerns of restrictionists,

contributions to the American economy); and §1153(b)(2) (providing for visas to be
issued to immigrants with advanced academic training or who possess "exceptional
ability").
150
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given its emphasis on visa compliance so as to preclude short-term guests
becoming long-term residents.
B.

Commodification Critiques

I end with a brief reflection on one deeply-held potential source of
discomfort with “visa-as-collateral,” namely the “commodification concern.”
Indeed, this provides a primary rationale for the persistence and vexing
nature of Levmore’s puzzle.
“Visa-as-collateral” reasonably might be grouped with a range of
proposals that fall under the umbrella of “market-based” approaches to
immigration. Market-based approaches share in common a critical approach
to the traditional view of the government as the best arbiter of who should
receive a visa. Rather, they assert, access to first world labor markets should
be available to those applicants who, having met certain eligibility
requirements, are willing to pay a market-based price.
These “market-based” approaches have been subject to a range of
critiques that broadly fall under the anti-commodification heading.
Commodification criticisms usually are based on the moral intuition that a
monetary value should not be attached to membership in the body politic that
is conferred to citizens. 153 The same moral intuition extends to affiliation
with the body politic as a visa-recipient, since even temporary affiliation
with the body politic carries certain rights and responsibilities. 154 Moreover,
since many citizens originally were temporary visa recipients, temporary
visas often signify a special affiliation with the polity and, in many cases, the
first step on a path to citizenship.
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These commodification critiques rely heavily on traditional accounts
of political membership or affiliation, which typically treat citizenship, and
even lesser affiliations with the polity as a visa-recipient, as a bundle of
rights -- a source of identity or an inalienable legal status. Given these
background philosophical underpinnings, it is not surprising that marketbased mechanisms of allocation of either citizenship or visas are anathema to
anti-commodificationists. The primary purpose of this section is to address
the commodification critique.

C.
Visa-as-Collateral Differs in Critical Ways from Traditional
Market-Based Proposals
Traditional market-based approaches to immigration share an
emphasis on allocating visas to the aliens who would benefit most from visas
and to the aliens who would be most highly valued by Americans. The logic
of selling citizenship represents the functioning of a global market for a
particular factor of production, that is, human capital, which will gravitate to
places where its contribution is greatest. Some economists advocate selling
citizenship as a rationing mechanism in which the entry price would be set to
maximize aggregate income for the native population. 155 Others advocate an
auction to the highest bidders, while some economists would limit the
auction to pre-qualified applicants. 156 Still others advocate proposals
combining traditional and market-based approaches, whereby admission is
granted to some, utilizing traditional criteria (i.e., according to
qualifications), and to others according to their willingness to pay. 157
There is a critical distinction between visa-as-collateral and these
market-based approaches. Visa-as-collateral advocates a “soft” utilization of
market approaches to accomplish entirely different goals. The point of this
proposal is not to allocate visas to the highest value users (although this
might be a side-effect of the policy). Rather, the purpose is facilitative,
155

JULIAN SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION (1989).
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namely, to accomplish the important goal of mitigating information
asymmetry challenges regardless of the potential migrant’s skills or ability to
pay the highest price for a visa.
Yet irrespective of one’s beliefs regarding the goals of immigration
law,
it is generally agreed that current methods of U.S. visa allocation fail
to accomplish goals that are fundamental to any successful immigration
policy. That is, having identified first order policy goals (such as recruiting
skilled persons or meeting labor-market shortages for low-skilled persons)
the current system does not appropriately meet these first order policy goals.
158

Although this proposal does not advocate the allocation of visas to
the highest value users, I recognize that my position implicates many of the
underlying sentiments against commodification. Anti-commodification
critics undoubtedly would argue that this proposal would disadvantage those
who are knowledge-poor, network-poor or cash-poor. These persons are
disproportionately likely to be at the bottom of the pyramid.

D. The Official,
Commodification

Public

and

Academic

Postures:

Non-

With rare exceptions, the official posture of the U.S. government is
one of non-commodification in immigration. This is evidenced, in part, by
the public pronouncements of immigration policy-makers, and explains why,
despite empirical evidence from other countries of the potential benefits of
auction systems, 159 both primary and secondary markets for visas have
received very little traction in U.S. policy-making circles. Indeed, even in
the current global economic crisis, in which other countries have auctioned
158

Even setting aside the debate surrounding the propriety of market-based
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visas to investors as a mechanism of jump-starting declining sectors of their
economies, the United States has remained resistant to such an approach. 160
This official posture of non-commodification coincides with polling
data on this issue, which show that a majority of Americans oppose
proposals to auction visas. The rationales offered by the polling data mirror
the anti-commodification rationales in the academic literature: visas, to the
extent that they signify potential access to citizenship, are understood by
Americans to be quintessentially public assets, 161 in part because even if
visas only allow temporary affiliation, many applicants overstay and later
receive amnesties that permit them to become citizens. Thus, the receipt of a
visa often signifies the first stage on a path to citizenship, and for this reason,
selling visas often is equated with selling access to a quintessentially public
asset. Indeed, visas might even be referred to as “public goods,” although
this is clearly an unconventional utilization of the term.
Analysts who have studied polling data suggest that the public’s resistance to
commoditizing visas arises in part from what students of cultural cognition
and behavioral economics have called a “framing problem.” 162 Thus, even
when confronted with evidence demonstrating the potential value of auctions
in resolving immigration dilemmas, social-psychological processes lead
individuals to assimilate evidence in a manner that is consistent with preexisting cultural frames that are dominant in the political marketplace. 163
These cultural frames are hostile to a market-based approach in the context
160
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of immigration and thus the average American voter appears unlikely to be
comfortable with the notion of utilizing the market as a primary method of
visa allocation. 164
E.

Tragic Choice Framework

Calabresi and Bobbitt argue that a primary challenge in society is “to
make allocations in ways that preserve the moral foundations of social
collaboration.” 165 Their book is entitled “Tragic Choices,” to capture the
idea that choices regarding the allocation of scarce goods inevitably will
breach some deeply-held societal values. They draw a distinction between
first-order and second-order allocation decisions, with the former relating to
how much of a scarce good will ultimately be produced, and the latter
relating to who will get the goods.
They argue that societies generally keep these decisions separate,
with each level of decision-making preserving a different mix of values. We
keep the levels separate so as to preserve the illusion that none of society’s
values have been disregarded. This shifting trajectory of decision-making is
characterized as a series of “subterfuges” 166 intended to shield the
allocational decision-making, or “tragic choices,” from public view. A legal
subterfuge is a device that accomplishes a desirable end while masking the
methodology that produced the end. Subterfuges are “useful – if dangerous –
lie(s)” that we use to cope with “tragic choices.” 167
There is clearly an analogy in the immigration arena to this modusoperandi: while the official U.S. posture is one of non-commodification, both
current and historical policy reflects concessions to commodification in
significant ways. One scholar argues that even a cursory view of U.S.
immigration history supports the view that persons have traditionally “paid”
very high prices to obtain the right to enter the U.S. 168 For example, as noted
in the “Sanjay” example above, under current U.S. immigration law, persons
seeking to obtain legal permanent residency under certain sections of the
INA may be obligated to invest at least one million dollars and employ at
164
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The term is from CALABRESI and BOBBITT, supra note 2.
The term “subterfuge” is Calabresi’s. CALABRESI, supra note 2.
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See Zolberg, supra note 16.
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least ten U.S. residents, and their status may be revoked if they do not meet
these commitments. 169 Moreover, there are also concessions to
commodification at the margins.
One might call these “unofficial
subterfuges,” as a cottage industry has developed with brokers and coyotes
charging applicants high fees to gain entry to the United States. Notably,
these fees are pervasive, not only in the underground markets, but also in the
formal markets, since elite applicants typically employ attorneys who charge
high fees to navigate the complexities of the INA. Recent investigative
reporting has uncovered instances of aliens employing lobbyists to intercede
on their behalf with Congressional staff, who in turn, intercede on their
behalf with the immigration authorities.
However, since the government is not the beneficiary of these fees
charged, we are more concerned with “official subterfuges.” Concerns about
“selling” visa access are surmountable when dealing with candidates like
“Sanjay” above, who constitute a tiny pool of very privileged applicants
operating above-board in a transparent marketplace. However, we become
much more concerned about the sale of visa access as we approach the
bottom of the pyramid -- when considered in the context of the acute poverty
of visa applicants from the third world, selling visas too obviously
contradicts anti-commodification values held by many Americans.
CONCLUSION: IF WE ARE GOING TO COMMODIFY, WE CANNOT
EXCLUDE THE BOTTOM OF THE PYRAMID
Precisely because we already use bond-like mechanisms to screen
rich and highly-skilled migrants by requiring them to pay attorneys and make
minimum investments in the U.S., the onus is to explain why we would forgo
similar opportunities with respect to poor migrants. The bonding proposal
made herein may expose the subterfuges 170 that necessarily accompany the
tragic choices that we make in immigration, the burdens of which
disproportionately fall on the poor. This proposal accomplishes immigration
law goals in a manner that reduces subterfuges and renders the choices made
somewhat less tragic, particularly for the poor.
Visa-as-collateral embodies the classic challenges of proposals that
seek to meet liberalism’s commitment to improve the lot of the least
169
170
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advantaged, while simultaneously meeting important consequentialist goals.
Aspects of the proposal may seem unattractive to those with liberal
commitments who are skeptical of initiatives which appear to increase
burdens on aliens, particularly those at the bottom of the pyramid. Yet, as a
practical matter, by reducing the likelihood and cost of visa-breaches, this
proposal improves the likelihood of access for those at the bottom of the
pyramid. If the world’s poorest have improved access to credit and to U.S.
labor markets, there are clear positive economic implications, not only for
migrants, but also for source-labor communities and countries. Thus, to the
extent that there is a trade-off between ethical commitments and
consequentialist goals, the trade-off is a worthy one.
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